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THE AMERIPAN POLICY OF COLLECTIVE SECURI'l'Y 
- . ---- . 
THROUGR1 THE UNITED NATIONS AS EXPRESSED .. ------ . ' __,........, __  
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\ ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this inquiry has been to subject to 
a critical analyais the American policy of collective security 
as expressed in the Korean act1on 1 . 1n order to deter mine h ow 
that policy has qeen expressed in a si gn ificant international 
is sue • . The writJr ha s approached the problem as a citizen 
of world eommunity compoEied of national states pledged to 
t1,,e task ~:r mana g ng that community for the common good . , 
It has be n the writer's aim to present a study of 
the develo p ing policy of the United States in regard to 
/ collective security wit hi n the framework of c urrent inter• · 
national developments . An ,extensive study of the official 
re cords of the United Nations has been made in order to 
I locate pri mary material which might serve as the basis for 
I 
hi storical evaluation • . The main body of the thesis has been 
developed from t h o~e re cords . , Portions of t he spe eches of 
t h e dele gates or a mmaries of them which preserve as much of 
t h e flavor of the delegates' statements as possible are fre-
quently cited . . \ 
l 
In ad dition to the official records of the United 
Natio n s, the records of the San Franciseo Conference have 
bean exa mined at l 
1
ngth in order to ascertain t he intentions 
of the si gnatories to the United Nations Charter and to serve 
as a guide in in terpret ing t h e Ch rter. Significant expressions 
iii 
I 
I 
of American pol tcy have been cited from the Ban Francisco 
Conference ·., from questions considered before the Security 
I Council prior to the Korean action., and from the evol ution 
of the American position with respect to Korea . The maj or 
I 
elements of posipions hold by other states have been included 
where necessary, in order to examine t h e American position 
I 
'f it h in the overall context of the particular :!.ssue in 
question . 
The results or the study seem to indicate some major 
develo pments in. t:he .American policy of collective security 
throu gh the Unite Nations . First., the United States no 
l onger places the de gree ·of' trust 1n the unanimity principle 
I 
hich 1t held at San Francisco . The . study of the development 
of American policy in the United Nations prior to the out .... 
break of hostilities indicated a persistent movement by the 
United States a11.ray trom the position it had held at San 
I 
Francisco . 
Second~ t~e Korean action marked the complete break -
1 
down of great power unity as the · sole means of supplying 
ef i'ective collect! e measures with Which to implement a policy 
of collective secu±,ity . The United Stat .es and other members 
of the United Nati~ns 1ere forced to develop i mprovisations 
in order to cope with the Korean problem . · 
Third, con \ideration of the Korean problem has led to 
t h e development of a new inte1 .,pretat1on of the Ohartiar as 
I 
witnessed in the "Unitin g for Peace" resolution . , For the first 
- I time, the United States has been willin g to allow the Gener al 
I 
iv 
r 
Assembly to part cipate, if necessary, in recommendations for 
enforoem~nt measures ~ 
Last, the United St tea has · demonstrated that it views 
I 
its national intJrests as vitally affected by the elfare of 
" 
the United Nation s. 
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\ CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTlON 
From the eat-lieat times of recorded history the 
attempts or humt:µi beings to erect structur s to preserve peace 
hav been witnessed and passed on to .succee ding generations . 
The League system developed by Athens ~- and exploited by that 
ancient democrac ~ in such a way as to produce its own Puin --
1 . . gave way to the fax Romana of the Roman Empire. W1th the col -
lapse of the Romr,n Empire, little organization to preserve 
peace was feasibie , and warfare in th Middle Ages was nQted 
l 
tor its savagery and lack of humanitarian rul s . 
With the R~formation, the idea of universal papal 
supremacy was destroyed, and the rise 0£ national states was 
favored . As these national states contended with one another 
to advance themselves or mutual interests, concepts of inter-
I 
national organization advanced with them . The British Empire, 
with its balance f power system. emerged in the nineteenth 
eentury as the st ongest single nation . capa bl e of preventing 
a major world conflagration . Great Britain managed to pre-
serve a fair degr~e of 
I 
ing her power to ~avor 
moment. l 
harmony in the world by adroitly shift-
one side ·or another at the opportune 
l ·\ 
Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise Historz of the Law of 
Nations (New York, 1950}, p • .35. 
I -
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Early 1J the twentieth century the balance of power 
I 
system broke down and the result was the First World War . 
The entrance of the United States into the European conflict 
I 
tipped the balance 1n favor 01· the Allies and paved the way 
for the creation \ of the League of Nations . After the war was 
over, the American people were .not as willing as President 
Wilson t ·o · depart I from the policy of isolation they had 
followed since th .a time of Washington's Farewell Address . 
I 
The United States attempted to avoid respons1bil1 ty 1n inter- . 
I 
national affairs and pursued her own national interests with 
11 ttle regard for the effects which her- policies might have 
on other nations or the stability of world peace . In the 
' 
meantime, the League of Nations struggled desperately to 
I 
achieve some means or preventing armed conflicts between 
nations, but was powerless to enforce 1ts will against a 
I 
major power . 
The treme~dous destruction brought about by the 
Second World War, which followed so close to that of the 
I first, convinced the overwhelming majority of Americans that 
the time had come to cast loose from the doctrine of isola -
~ 
tion and to ventur~ forth to create some lasting organiza-
tion for the preservation of international peace . On 
October 24, 1945, the American people bound themselves to a 
I 
new experiment in government. On that day, Secretary of 
I 
State James F'. Byrnes signed and published the protocol of 
\ . 
I 
-3-
deposit of ratif ~cations of the United Nations Charter in 
I l 
behalr of the American people. • 
. The obje l tives of this study will be to examine the 
maruler in whic~ lbe United States has expressed her policy 
of co],.leetive se i urity in seven . ~e~ected questions eonsidere~ 
· .by the United Na ions prior to ·the ·Korean action, and .to 
.! ,. , .. ; 
\.,' 
' -·endeavo?,' to determine how that poliey ha,s been modifie<J. · or :,_ 1.: , 
,,' ·' ., • .·, • • , , ·•: \ , I • . • • ' , • ; ·,.•, _i .•·:: 
.. ,;;,developed - by the Ko;:rean action. _. Tb:,e method used in the · ,/ ,: '. ·(::,."· 
- inquiry will be J o . present mate .ri~l ·' taken from the offi.~-i~l .. ,f;~ 
records of the unlited Natio ns and ~ther sources.' in OPder .. ~o',l'.,'..'\' 
· determine sign!fi \cant expressi,ons ot American policy ~1 th1: ·, ·. _:./ 
the · context of th particular issue or issues involved. 
From the material p~esented tha wri tezt will offeP an inter-: · 
·? '1 
"" ,•. '. ' 
. pre ta ti on of the developing 
0
Ame
1
r1cati policy and the poesib-1~ · \ · 
· significance of t e issues brought forth in the develop ~~nt -.,::: ,:. 
of collective sec1tr1ty through the United NatiQns . 
J. Eugene laarley, Doeumentiu'f Textbo9k on the 
United Nations (Lo~ Angeles, Californ a, 1950); p. 841. 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I CHAPTER II
OOLLEOTIVE SECURITY: THE EVOLUTIOW OF AMERICAN 
POLICY IN\SEVEN. QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE 
SECURl1Y OOUNOIL OF THE UNITED NA~IONS 
A Oom1ariso~ ,of ~ertain ,Oha:ra~teristics of the Un ted Na,t!ons and the .League of' .Nations 
I 
As the n1at1ons of the world approached their second 
attempt in the twentieth century at international government, 
I 
questions were rfiised a to the extent of authority to be 
I • 
dele gated to the 1Un1ted Nations . The League of Uations had 
been based upon the strict sovereignty of national states and 
requlred unanimity among the member states to obtain consent 
for action . The United Nations Charter was drafted during th 
l 
Seco nd World War, when the effectiveness of unanimity among 
the - gr 13:it ];\}Wern acting tc-gether to suppress the militim.t ex -
\ 
pension of the Axis was clearly apparent . Desiring to retain 
this instrument of collective security, the five great powers 
I 
insisted upon, and were aecord .ed, permanent seats on the new 
Security Council; \and eaeh power was permitted to frustrate 
Security Council recommendations and orders by means of a 
I 
negative vote . I 
S-ince the iOharter conferred ttprlmary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security" on 
the Security Council and endowed it with enforcement powers 
-4-
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1 
of a military nature, the United Nations clearly seems to 
have been designed to be capable of enforcing its will upon 
I 
offending states of lesser rank . It remained to be seen 
whether the Charter would be at all adeq~ate as an ins _trum.ent 
of collective se~urity if the great powers should quarrel 
among themselves . By the same token, it remained to be seen 
whether the Unit d Mations would grow so much in power and 
I 
authority, through stro ng leadership and Charter interpreta~ 
I 
tion, as to . become eventually a supranational authority • . , 
as 1t to become endowed with an autho:ri ty superior , 
I 
- to that of the so1Vereign nations; or was 1 t an organization 
~cting as an agent of sovereign nations, and, hence, inca-
pable of going betond.the wishes or any one of its great 
power principals? Th~ United States would have a major 
part in the outoo,e . The policy of the United states as 
2 
indicated during se~en cases considered by the Security 
Council from 1946 \to 1950 ~ill be analyzed in an endeavor 
·to ascertain how the United States as a ·member state has 
expressed her views in regard to the proble~ of collective 
I 
security through t\he Uni tad Nations . 
l 
Charter of the United Nations, chap . VII, par . 39-51. 
2 I 
The seven cases selected are: the Iranian , Greek, 
and Indonesian questions, the Co:vfu Channel Incidents, and the 
Palestine, India - Pakistan, and Berlin questions . 
'I 
'• 
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The Procedure 'for Handling International Disputes 
Culminating in or Likely to Culminate 
' in Armed Conflict 
The United States has contributed a great deal to 
I -
the development pf . an orderly procedure within the United 
I . 
Nations to cope with international disputes leading to 
armed conflict . \Proceeding from the Iranian questio n i n 
1946 to the developments of the India - Pakistan question to 
I . 
19.50, a rather consistent evolution in procedure has taken 
I plaGe in which the United States has been the principal 
designer. The uJi ted States has contributed mainly by the 
res~lutions which \ she has drafted, those to which she has 
lent her ·support, 1 and those against which she has used her 
I 
vote and influence. Ernest Gross summarized th i s procedure 
I 
during February, i950, while speakin g before the Security 
1 
Council on the India-Pakistan question. Drawing on the 
I 
e~perionce of the Renville Agreement in the Indonesian case 
.. and the experience of the armistice agreements in the 
' I -
Palestine case, bei stated the American position . The method 
· outlined by Gross ~as composed of three main steps: · elimi .rta-
- l . 
tion of military pressure, supervision by the United Nation .a;' 
I 
and the attainment \ of a lasting po~i .tical solution . 
I This proceaure aime d first at eliminating the "mili -
tary pressure" bet t een the two partfes . The elimination of 
I 
, 1 
I Un,ited Nations Security Gouno:2,l Official RecQrds, 
"5th, Yr . , 467th Meet!\ing, 24 February 1950, No. 9, · pp. 12- 18. 
Hereafter referred to as u. l . s . c. Oft . Rec . 
this pressure was to be re garded as a "stop - gap measure" 
only . It wast \ serve as a means of bringin g about a more 
favorable atmosphere, freer of tension , in order that the 
parties in dispute might be able to arrive at a .mor e lasting 
political settlement- - and thus rem.o·ve the differences from 
the realm of . armed conflict . This settlement was to be made 
under the 11aegis f of . the Securit y Council, .as Wa:t':ren Austin 
. . 1 
had recommende d earlier in the India - Pakistan question . 
The second part of the process concerned the amount 
of initiative th e United Nationa S~ourity Council was to . 
take . . According to the American position, the Security 
Council was to bJ free to step in, if necessary:, while "the 
. 1 
e f fe c tuation of a cease - fire and demilitarizati _on :erogram 
2 
was in process . " Ear+y in the India - Pakistan ease , Philip 
Jes sup mf:lintained that . the subsidiary organs .of the Security 
Council should be endowed with broad powers and responsi -
bility , and that \ the Council 
on th e se subsidiary organs or 
3 
similar task . 
should place great reliance 
individuals performing a 
The last phase of the solution of the problem lay in 
attainin g the lasting political solution . Here the American 
' 
1 
U.N.s.c. 10ff . Rec. , 3r d Yr., 235th Meeting , 24 January 1948, No. I - 1.5, PP• 260-62. 
2 
Ibid . , ·5th Yr . , 467th Meeting , 24 February 19.50, 
No. 9 , pp:-I'2°- 18. 
3 
Ibid . ; Jr~ Yr . , 382nd Meeting , 25 November 1948, 
No. 127 , p7°9 . 
I 
pos1 tion of pla61 ,ng that rasponsib111 ty upon the parties to 
the . disp1;_1te has b en a difficult one to implement • . Although 
the American position !thin the United Nations ha generally 
follow d the sincere efforts of its delegat to pursue a 
I 
policy dedueed fro m such a premise, the present day realities 
l 
ot international politics have introduced another element ,. 
Any app~aisal of the effectiveness of a collective 
se~urity poliey 1pursued under ·the aegis of the United Nations 
is subject to tre complications introduced by the inequality 
of the influence exerted by the great powere in an inter -
national -~ommunlity of allegea.ly "equal' t- states . Thus, in 
·the Palestine clase, the sudden 'de facto reeognition of thfl 
- 1. 
State of Israel by Preside nt Truman qoubtless acted as 
strong factor in determin ing the eventual political solution 
(even though on of the parties t ·o the dtspute was strongly . 
against just th!e solution this ·action t'ostered- - parti tion 
-ana· the recogni ltion of Isttael as an independent state) . A 
similar instance of having to ditferentiata between the 
. I 
' effectiveness of United Nations measures as United Nations 
measure s and measures adhered to because of the influ · nce 
l I 
F. Lee Benns. Euro in its orld 
Sett1~ (7th ed.; New York, • The ~reside nt 
took action so 1rapidly that h~ did not even pause to notify 
the American dele gation at the G neral Assembl y prior to 
his announeement . At the time, the American delegatio n was 
pressing a plan fort .mporary trusteeship, having asked the 
Council to sus~end the implementation of the partition plan . 
------~------~--- -
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of great powers 'was demonstrated in the Indonesian c-ase, 
where again the l1asting political solution was effected by 
the influence o~ a great power .
1 
The United States• Definition of 
"Threat to the Peaceu 
In the Berlin question the American definition of 
I 
what constitute 1 a threat to the peace was summarized by 
Jessup in asking that Chapter VlI of the Charter be invoked . 
According to Jessup, a "threat to the peace is created when a 
state uses fore~ or the threat of force to secure compliance 
with 1 ts demands It ·• . . . This definition maintained that 
"when the act 1, aggressive and threatens th& use of force, 
· but falls short lor an armed attack , it constitutes an act of 
aggression or a threat to the peace • • • • Jessup concluded 
that a:i-med attack might be repelled by armed attack under the 
right or self defense, individually or collectively , under 
2 
Article 51 of the Charter. 
1
u.N.s.h. Off . Rec. , 4th Yr-. , 39 8 th Meeting , 
11 January 1949t No. 2, pp . 2- 10 . The United States de-
nowieed the Netperlands government for its non - cooperation 
with the Committee of Good Offices and for its violation of 
the Charter by the illegal use of force in open defiance of 
an order of the Security Oouncil . The United States dele ga -
tion then concluded i •ts position by announcing the admiration 
with which its government viewed the efforts of the Indonesian 
people to gain fheir independence , and stated that the United 
States would continue to support them in an endeavor to work 
out a peaceful ~djustment of the dispute . 
2 
U.N. S. c . Off . Rec . , 3rd Yr . , 363rd Meeting, 
6 October 1948, No. 115, pp . 1- 27. 
The Posi t:ton of the United States . on the 
Implem~n t ation of a _United Nations -
Co l eotive Security Pol icy I · and the Veto 
At the ~n Francisco Conference the United States 
delegation , conf .ronted 1th strong resistance from many 
delegates to the !exercise or a negative vote by a permanent 
member whioh proo.uced the requirement of unen1mi ty mong the 
permanent member { the veto) , bad contended th.at the veto 
would be exerois1 seldom, if ever . It implied that failure 
to agree to the jnimity prine1ple among the perrosnent mem• 
bers would be ta11tamount to defeating acceptance of the 
Che.rt-er; and , fUlj'thermore , tbs.t the great powers would uae 
· the veto for the j1nt ·erests of ·th~ worid organ:tze.tion re.th.er 
than for their own selfish interests. . 
The extreme po.si ti on regarding the unan1m1 ty prin • 
ciple -• adh$red t tenaciously by the United State$ at San 
Fr a nei sco- •wa s mf:ified in the process . of considering the 
Greek question . The United States had sponsored a resoluti<n 
establishing a c •mmission of investigation consisting of one -
2 
representative or each member of the Oouneil . Th$ eommisst on 
. bad inve .stigated j the question on the spot from January to 
United Nations Conference on Interne.tional Or niza -
ti on D-ocumen s , o • , omm as on • ... ee u;r ty Coune , 
(New York , !945) , p . 493 . For the strong objections to the _ 
veto principle a s set forth see the reports of Committee IIJ/1, 
PP • 429 - 531 ot Vol . ll . Herea:rter ret'erred to as U. N. Conf . 
lntntl . Org. 
2 I U. N.S . C. Off . Rec . , 1st Yr . , 8:nd Ser1ea 0 87th Meeting, 
19 December 1946~ Ne. 28 , PP• 700 - 0l . 
-11-
l 
submitted a divided report. During July A;Pril of 1947, tr,-en 
and August of 19~7, five proposals had been made and rejected 
in an attempt to resolve the issue . The United States had 
I - -
then propose d the establishment of a commission to implement 
the recommendat19ns of the investigation commission . When 
this proposal haa been rejected, the United States then pro-
I 
posed that the Council determine that a threat to the peace 
I 
existed under Chapter VII of the Charter . In anticipation 
~ 
of a rejection by veto of the second resolution by the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, the American view was strongly 
worded . The United States delegation contended that such a 
I 
' 
veto in the Council could not "preclude individual or collec -
tive action by states willing to act as long as they act in 
- I 
accordance with the general purposes and principles of the 
. 2 
United Nations . "! Nevertheless, the second proposal was also 
rejected, and, after much debate, the United States proposed 
that the matter e dropped from the Security Council agenda 
3 
and sent to the General Assembly . 
The neg~tive vote by the u.s .s .R. in the Corfu 
Channel case ha~ prevented the acceptance of the report of 
1 
No. 2. 
U.N. s . g . Off . Rec . , 2nd Yr . , Special Supplement, 
No. 74, 
2 
Ibi d. ~ -12nd Yr., 180th Meeting, 12 August 1947," j :--!'9"10 ·1 
Ibid . , 202nd Meeting , 15 September 19~7, No. 89, 
.. 12 .. 
1 
the investigati.n subcommi ttee••a repo1•t v.rhich cle~rly im-
' puted Albanian responsibility fol' the laying or the mines 
' . 2 
which had damageq British arsbips .. 
The Gr ej question nd the Corfu Ohe.nnel case brought 
forth the problem anticipated by many of those at San Fre.n.-
ciseo- ~the obstJction of the Council from pe;fo:rming its 
stated purpose bJ the u~a of' the veto . 'fh~ United States 
modified he:t $ah ranc:tsco position and even vrent so fa~ as 
to take the pos1 ion that she would disregard. the veto in 
order to carry out the purposes and principles of the Obarter, 
t Am$i,.ean Polj.oy oz 19_50 cm C pters ~ Vt arid . VI! • 
. j ol t a rter 
By Feb.-,:ey 1950, the united States had olarifie<l 
het>_ position in l!'eg&Jtd to Chapters 'f I VI, and VII of the I . 3 . 
Gha3:'ter. . Gross 1 summary be-_tore the Ooune11 that month 
clearly showed tbat the A:mer1can policy ot collective 
security through the United Nations meant that the United 
States intended ihe United Nations to play a strong part 1n 
the settlement o: international disputes. A regular proe~-
dul?e for bandlin disputes was developed in whieh the situ.a• 
tj,on __ was to be kjpt as mueh as possible within Obaptel' VI 
. t . l I . . 
U.N.S.O Off. Re-0., 2nd Yr-., 122nd Meeting , 
25 March 1947, N?• 29, pp, 608~09. 
2 
Ibid., 120th Meeting, 20 March 1947, No. 27, 
upplemen't!<5., Annex 22 1 pp . 7'7 .. 109. 
3 
Ibid•• 5th Yr . " 467th Meeting , 24 february 1950 1 
No. 9, pp~ - 18 1 
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( Pacific Settlement of · Disputes) - of the Charter. · Th.is was 
to be accomplishJd by: the establishment of commissions of 
inve ·atigation, t ~e rac111tation of negotiation, truce com-
missions; and ottler means . which might aid the effectuation 
of a last1 .ng po1 J t1cal solution by the parties . to a dispute - -
an under the ae 1i• of the Security . Oouncil, 
If the m, asures advanced by the Coune11 under · 
Chapter Vl were deemed to be inadequate, Chapter VII should 
be invoke d by de J la.ring the existence of a "thre-a.t to · th~ -
pe ace, n a ubreac J of the peaee," or "an act of aggression . " 
The Council shou ~d then make its recommendations, and ~he. 
various nations f euld move to implelllflnt tbeae reeO~nda -
tions, placing 1ea t relianee on the subs\diary organs 
established .by t j e Council . 
If the Council (in the performance of its 'p rimary 
responsibility fJr the maintenance of international peace 
and securityn a~ stated in Chapter V) were to be obstructed 
by a negative ·vo e of a permanent. member; sucn a misuse of 
the veto was not to tlpreclude individual or e~lieetiv~ action 
by states wiliin to aet as long as they act in ·aqcordance 
with the gen eral purposes and principles , of the United 
Nations." Thus, a 11strict" interpretation of the · voting 
procedure ._in rt;igjrd to perman~nt members under Chapter V w~s . 
to be avoided . ~nstead the United States favored a "loose 
construetion . tt · !h e advocated strongly the interpretation 
that the veto was to be used seldom if at all, and that 
-14-
action in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
. I 
United N·ations Charter could be taken even though a veto had -
I .. , 
been used . In effect , the United States• position was that 
I . 
a misuse of the 1eto rendered the veto unenforceable . I 
By the t1me :.the I . Korean problem came to the attention 
of the 
to the 
Seeurity, ·oo"UI?-eil 
veto had ~hanged 
in 1950, American policy in regard · 
considerably fro!»- the views the 
United States had e~pre s sed at San Franc ·iseo . 
f ,\_f I l' n' I t 
From the ex-
treme position o.ti 1n.s1stenee upon the principle of unanimity, 
, I . . \ 
the United. States•position had been modified to the point 
where it advoeate 1d the dis ·regarq. of a ~eto (when a sufficient 
. I 
number of the ·Securl ty Oouncil d~legati~ms indicated that the 
will o.t' the Oouncll might be obstructed , and the Council I . , 
might be rendered \ incapable , o_f _performing its responsibil1 t'ies 
under th e Charter) . The United States ~ad follewed a con-
I 
sistent poli cy or 1 strengthening the · authority o:£ the United 
Nations .as each crse was consi dered . American policy re -
garded the United
1
_Nations as an 1ntern ,ational aut~ority with 
greatly expanded powers of ·1nvestigation and with the ability 
'j 
to advocate strong enforcement measures if necessary to main-
I 
tain international pe ace and security . The Korean problem 
• I . 
provided the occasion ror the United States to go so far as 
I . 
to advocate the u~e of the Gene~al Assembly to support en-
. i foreement measur~~ - -eVien if this policy meant the reversal 
ot the position hJla by the Unite d States at San Franeisoo . 
,;:"'· / ' 
OH.APTER l!l
TlilE l!ACKGRO IID OF fflE KOREAN P!IOBLWII, 194$• 1950 
Kore~• s Historical ttinde12e:nderic-e" 
Until -tJe Japane -se-Korean treaty of 1876, Korea b~d 
been a dependen ~ of China, exe:reising local autonomy, but 
paying tribute to China and being :ra,gal:'ded as her ward. 
Japan interpret Id the ·treaty 0£
1
1676 a.s granting Korea in-
dependenee in ti Western sense and proceeded to expl oit 
Korea until con111ot with China _over t~eir _competing in-
terests eulminatj j~d in the Sino ... Japanese War and the end ot 
. 2 
the •1shu-p ng" lelati onship between Ohina and Koi:-ea. : th 
the Treaty of S . im.onoseki ( 1895) Korea beeame an 1ndepena.ent 
; 3 
sovereign state under Western intern ational law . Rivalry be-
tween Japan and Russia led to the Fh1sse .. Japane .se War,- and in 
the Treaty of !'orti,mouth (190.$) Russia., as the loser, ae-
l<n0wle4ged Jap,•s pa.ramount inte:re~t in K®ea. On November 17, 
190:S, Japan secrxed control of the fot>e1gn J:'lelat1ona 0£ Korea 
·. 4 
by treaty, a,nd KoPea became a protectorate of Japan with 
. . .. . 
1 
Iv1. Frederiek Nelson ., Korea . and the Old Orders in 
Asia (Baton Rou e, La., 1946), pp . 131, 1j4 -37. ' 
2 
Ibid. , pp . 212-13. 
,-
Ibid . , p . 242. J+-
Willi I, ~ Langer, An Encyclopedia of World Histou 
(Bosto n , 1948), p . 892. 
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, 1 
American eonsenti. The Second World War brought far - reaching 
changes in Asia land* with them, the rene wed question of 
I Korea•s "indep~ndence . 11 
When Pre
1
sident RoosevHlt, Prime Minister Churchill, 
and Generalissi 
1
o Chiang Ka.i-shek met a.t Cairo from 
November 22- 26, ~943, they laid the foundation for the post-
ar policy in Asia which l ter met with serious difficulties 
in Korea (Russia was not represented at the Cairo Declaration _, 
not being at war \ with Japan at the time) . The deelsions of 
the meeting ere ! clearly state~t 
1fhe Three Gr at Allies are fighting this 
war to l"f;lstrain and punish the aggression of J pan . 
T~ey cov~t no gain for themselves and have no · 
thought pf territorial expansion . , It is their -,-
purpose ~hat Japan shall 1:>e stripped of all the -
islands fn the Facii'ic which she has seized or 
occupied \ sinee the beginning of the First World ar 
in 1914, and that all the territories Japan ha s 
stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria ; Formosa, 
and the J>eseadorea, shall be restored to the Re-
public of China . Japan will also be expelled fro m 
all othef territories whie~ she has -ta.lr&n by_ 
violence and greed . The aforesaid three gr~at 
powe,rs, mindful of the enslavement of the pe .ople of 
Korea, a~e determined that in due course Korea shall 
beeome f:ree and 1n depende nt . 2 
.t 1111ed 4greement;3, 1945 I . . -
At PotsdfD , July 26, 194-5, the President of the 
United States and the Prime inister of Great Brit in signed 
' t • • 
the Potsd .am Proclamation ( concur-?"ed in by despatch by the 
Presiden t of the !National Government o~ China) confirmin g 
1 . . 
M. Fre d~:rick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in 
Asta, pp . 267- 71. Japan annexed Korea Sy !916.. · 
- 2 I . . 
Cairo P~clar ;ation , cited by liarold R. Isaacs, 
New Cycle in Asi~ (New York, 1947), p .. 29. 
I 
' \ 
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the Cairo Declaration: "(8) The terms or the Cairo Declara-
·tion shall be ca J ried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be 
11m1 ted to the i lands of Honshu, Hokkaido, · Kyu hu, Shikoku 
and such minor 1J1ands as we determine . " 
1 
1· . . ' 
On August 6, 194$, an atomic bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima . On AJgust 8, a bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, 
' 
e.nd the Soviet uJ1on declared war on Japan and invaded Man-
churia . On AuguJt 10; t~e Japanese government announ~ed 
2 
readiness . te sur~ender . In her declaration of w r against 
Japan, the SovieJ Union asaoc!ated herself with the pledge 
contained 1.~ the 10airo Declaration and confirmed at Potsdam , 
.) 
that Korean independence would be restored in "due course . " 
As -a resJ~t o,f a· ~ilitary decision .to effect the 
surrender ·of Japalnese ·'forces · in Korea , Japanese troops north 
I 
of the thirty-eighth piU'allel were to surrender to Soviet 
I 
forces , and those south or the thirty - eighth parallel were 
to surrender to United State s forces . After this decision 
had been put 1.nto l e ffect, in September , 194.5, the thirty-
eighth: parallel was interpreted by the Soviet occupation 
authorities to be a permanent delineation between two mili -
tary zones . The , nited Stat,s comniander attempted to 
negotiate ar~angetn,ents which would allow passage between the 
l I _ 
Potsdam Proclamation Defining Terms for:- Japan•s 
SurFender:-, cited by Isaacs, New czcle in Asia; pp . 5-6. 
2 
Ibid . , p l 3 . 3-
~ - , pi 88 . 
j,• 
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two sections or the country, but ~he Soviet occupation 
I 
authorities regarided the delineation as a military one• and 
1 
the question was t aken up on a governmental level. 
In Deeemb~r, 1945, the Foreign Ministe?is of the 
· United States, th j United K_1ngdom, and the Soviet Union; 
meeting in Moscow , arrived at an agreement concerning the 
future ' status of Ko:rea . 'l'his Moscow agreement r ecei ved the 
adherence of the rhinese Government also; It provided f .or: 
· ( l) t}?;e ttcreation \ or cGndi tions for developi ng the country 
on democt-atic pr1~eiples"; (2) ~he establishment of a Joint . 
, I 
Commission, consi.stlng of representatives of the United 
States command in southern Korea and representatives or the 
C 
Soviet conunand ot nQrthe:rn Korea; to . assist in the formation . · "f 
. . 
. . I 
of a provisional Korean government; (3) the alibmiss1on of .. 
I . ,._ .. ,. 
proposals of the Joint Commission t•eoncerning a four-powe%' .. · · 
t?r\lsteeship of KoJ ea for a period up to .five years~ to th~ ·,. 
' '~· 
· ·four powex-s; and (4) a conference within two weeks of repre~ '. j 
sentatives o:t the United States and Soviet commands in , Ko~e~ · 
for the purpose ofi effecting permanent coordination in admin• _ 
l • 
,. 
btt:rative-economic matters between northern and southern 
2 
Korea , 
Deadloc~ of 'the Join~ Commission ' 
The J oint ommisaion ·met on Marc h 20~ 1946; but soon 
I 
l t . 
. u. s .. '.Department of state, Korea 194.5•19q.8, Publica-
tion 3305, (Washington, 1948), p . J . · · · 
2 I 
Communique of the Moscow Conference or the Three 
Foreign Ministers, cited by Isaacs, New Cycle in Asia, . pp. 90-91. 
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bee st lemated through inability to agree on the defini-
tion of th word fld moeratictt as it pertained to r pr enta -
• I 
ti v s of the parties and social organizations mentioned in 
the Moscow Agreement, and th Commission adJourned sine die 
~ -----
on May 8, 1946, . In a 1. tter delivered to For 1gn Minist .er 
V. • ·01otov dur ng the Foreign Ministers 1 Oonterence in 
Moscow in April , f 947, General Gor ge arsh 11 (United 
State ~ Secrets. ?>y ot State) br .ought the matter to the att n:.. 
tion of the Soviet Foreign Min1ste:r in requesting that the 
I l 
Joint Commission l"'econvene . 
Molotov replied a fwd 1e later with a proposal 
that the Joint U. $ . S.R.•U . S. A. Commission resume its ork 
on My 20, 1947, 1b order to implement the Moscow Agreement 
p rtaining to Korea . ~olotov also proposed that during July 
and August ot 1947 the Oommi sion should "submit to the .two 
gov rnments f'o:r cof s1dex- tion the r sults of its work in 
elabor ting r commend tions in res ct to the establishme t 
2 
ot pro'7isiona.l -f<@rean democratic govermn$nt . n 
The Joint dommi.ssion reconvened on May 21, 1947, and . 
oon became st lem~ted again . The United States and : Soviet 
del ga..t1ons v ere not even able to agree on a joint r por.t 
on the status ot the d liberations in the Joint Commi sion . 
1 
Marshall Lf)tter on Korea, cited by Isaacs , New 
Oycl in Asia, pp . 94-96. -
2 I 
Molotov's~ ply, cited by Isaacs, New Cycle in Asia, 
pp . 96-99. 
I 
I 
The United State then pro posed to the Soviet Union, on 
August 26 1 1947 1 that four paver meetings be held to consider 
I 
how the Mose Agreement could be speedily rried out . 
On Se tem,beI' 4; 194'1• the Soviet Union rejected the 
1 
proposa l• - on the grounds that such a eonference would b 
outside the soop ~ or the ~oseow Agreement . The United 
States , feeling t _t further negotiations 1th .the Soviet 
Union were futile and would only delay the urgent claims 
of the Korea n p o le to ind ependence, broug ht the whol . 
question of Koreap independence before the Gen ral Assembly 
l 
on September 17, 1947 . 
Korea Before the General Assembly 
. I 
The question or Uthe independence or Koreatt came 
I . 
before the second regular session ot the Oen ral Assembly• a 
I 
session that was noted .for the conspicuous acrimony and bad I 2 
feeling - between the United States and the Soviet Union . 
When the United S°liates representative introduced the problem 
for consideration by the First Committee, he blamed the 
u~s.s.R. tor the failure · of the Jo.int Commission because it 
had refused to grant consultations to political parties am. 
aoc1al organizations opposed to trusteesh1p . He deel red 
that his country (1Un1ted St~tes) was eager to w1tlnrew her 
u. s . De'Pf3,l rtment of State, Korea 1945-1948 , pp •. 2 .. 
Eugene P. Chase, The United Nations in Action 
(Mew York , 1950) , rP • 113- 15. 
I 
l 
I 
I 
J 
l 
'I' 
l 
i 
l 
I 
l 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
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troops, but such a \Ji.thdrs.wa1 would have to follow the .forma-
tion ot a single goverrunent repre~ent .ing th Korean people . 
I 
He propos d the ,stablishment of a Unit d Nations T mporar-y 
I 
Commission to observt elections with the purpose ot estab~ 
11sh1ng a National As eDlbly. This Assembly would then form 
a national government for all Kozaea and take over the rune• 
1 
tions of the commanders of the occupatt .on for .ees in Korea . 
I 
The u~s .• s.B. char ged that the United States had 
violated her obli 1gations under th Moscow Agreement in r gard 
to the selection bt the political parties and soc! 1 o~gani-
~·ations entitled ~o be heard . lt was further charged that .. 
the United States had r~jected the u~s.s.R. propo$al on the 
establishment of a Korean Constituent Assembly •hieh would 
consist or repres~ntatives of the politio l parties . and 
ocial organizations with which Kor a might form . a · provisional 
government . The ~oviets stat d that the United States had P • 
fused to I ccept their proposal advocating s1multan ou with-
drawal of the U.S ~S. B. ~~ American troop from Korea early 
1n 1948, and, the~efore, 
for the breakdown 11n the 
th United States was responsible 
Joint Commission . The u.s.s.H. 
maintained unsucce lssi'ully that the Ko:rean qu stion, in the 
l 
Unit d ff tions Secretariat, Research Section, 
Background Papers, o . 62, 18 May 1950, p . 4. Hereafter 
referr d to as u. N •. Secretariat . . 
I 
I 
\ 
l 
I 
I 
l 
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am category ~a other questions connected with peac 
· treaties~ should 1be decided by the two powers concerned -and 
1 
did not 11 within the jurisdiction of the United Na.tiona~ 
Th Sovi t government he -ld that a free government . 
could not b est~bli hed until after the complete withdraw$l 
' . 
of' foreign t~oops; therefore, the General Assembly should 
consult with r prosentatives _ ot the Korean p opl befor~ 
I . 
ma.king a deci ion on the matter . Th u.s .S.R. int.rod.uc ·ed a 
propo~ 1 to invitk representatives ~r the Korean people ·rro~ 
-r Southern and Northern Kor a. to take part in the discussion or· 
• 1 the question . Th~ . United States maintain d th$t such con~ul -
. \ ts.tions should b-e held in Korea in order that a United ·1ationa . 
" I 
.. I 
< . 
. . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Comm1se1on might ~e able to ascertain who the elected repre -
2 
sentatives of Korea might be . The majority ot the :Political 
Committee .favored ltbe American view; a3 a resulti the u.s .. s .R. 
' deela~e d that if I United Nations Temporary Commission were 
I • 
to be set up without the participation of the Korean J)eople 
in the d1"$euss1ons 1 of the G~neral Assembly, the u.s .s~R. 
I . J 
would be ·unable to take part in the -Com.DQ.ssion. 
· 1 
u. N. •. S&cretariat, Research Section, Backgroun d · 
Papers, N'o. 62, 18 May 1950, p . 5~ 
2 
~ -• P~ l 6 
3 I 
United Nations General Assembl O.fficial Reco--rds, 
2nd Session, 19 7; Summary Record o.f Meetings, 1 September -
19 November , Pirst ,Comm.1ttee, p. 281 ~ Hereafter referre d to 
as U.N.G. A. Ort . R~c . 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
.\ 
-I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
I 
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I 
United Nati-~ns Tempo·rary Oommission on Kor-e~ 
Nevertheless, on November 14, 194-7, the General 
I 
,Assembly proe ede 1d to form a United ations Temporary Oommis- ·•': 
sion on Korea . Tr,e task of the Commission was to facilitate 
the est .ablishn;lent of · a national governm.ent of Korea by means 
' 
of nation-wt de el~ctions and • to prov~de for .the wi thdraYiaJ. 
· of th: occupat:!.on \ forces . - '?his Ool'lll!lissi.on was composed -ot 
Australia, Canada , ·. Ohina, El Salvador, France,. 
Ph1l1pp1.nes , · and • he Ukrainian Soviet Soci list Repubiic'.": , ;'. _ _:,/tt 
It as. authorized to travel,. observe, - and 
The ·Ukrainian s .. s . R. l'ef .ttaed to 
consult throug~out · · · .:· 
' ' 
,; ' '.:~ 1 • , 
participate in · '.tt).e ·:.,-r: 
ork of the Commiss ion on grounds s_imilar to thos 
1 
l '.(,; 
p,resented .; " _ '._':· 
I ,: 
· by the u.s .• s.R. ' ' . i 
· The · Tempor\ary Commission endeavored . to carry ou~ ~.~~ ', ). 
task, but was unable to mak contact with .military authorities : 
in North Korea . The u.s .. s.R. 1 s pe:rmanent rep:resentatives at 
the United Nations headquarters made tteferences to the "ne 'ga• · 
, tiveu attitude of their government toward the establishment 
of.' the Temporary Commission in Korea . 'fhe Gomm1s·s1on then 
I 
decided to consult with the Interim Committee in order to 
2 
obtain . its view on a method , of procedure . 
The Interim Committee 
The Interi~ Committee had been established by the 
l I 
u. N. Secre ·tariat, Research Section, Background 
Papers, No. 62, 18 May 1950, pp . 6-7. 
2 
ill!! •, PP• 1 7- 8. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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General Assembl7 in November of 1947 to funetion un~il the 
next regular session of the Assembly. Among its powers were 
those authorizing the Temporary Commission on Korea to con-
sult the Interim Committee with respect to t fle applicatio n 
of ·the Assembly's resolution establis h ing the 'l'emporary Com-
mission . (The u..s . S. R. had . strongly objected to the estab-
lishment of the Interim Committee and had refused to partici -
pate in its work., on the grounds that it was a violation of 
the Charter and was an unconstitutional method of avoiding 
the unanimity rule 0£ the Security Couneil--a 4ev1ce which 
ultimately would \usurp the powers and prerogatives -of the 
. l 
Security Council itself . ) 
'!'he 'l'empdrary Commission informed the Interim Com-
• 
mittee that under the General Assembly resolution it was to 
be concerned wit~ the whole of Korea and not just one part 
of it. Under the circumstances, most of the members of the 
Temporary Commission felt that the formation of a separate 
I 
government in South Korea could not be a "national govern-
ment" , nor would it facilitate the withdrawal of the occupy-
ing forces . The Australian representative believed that an 
election in only one part of Korea would be contrary to the 
I 
1 
U. N.G. A. Off . Ree . , 2nd Session, Summary Record of 
Meetings, 16 Septe(mber- 19 November 1947, First Committee, 
PP• 329-35. The representatives of the Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic ;, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukr&i.nian 
s . s . R. and Yugoslavia sided with the Russian argument, and 
also refused to participate in the work of the Interim Gom-
mi ttee. I 
I 
l 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
.\ 
I 
I 
-I 
I 
I 
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I 
I 
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I 
General Asaembly resolution, and that the setting up of a 
government in the South would give rise to the establishment 
of~ government in the North -- which would place the Un~ted 
I 
!fations in a difficult posi t1on . The Interim Commi tte~, 
i 
ne.vertheless, · deqided on February 26, 1948, that the \ 
Temporary Commission should implement th e General Asse~bly•a 
resolution in such parts"as are accessible to the Com-
· 1 
mission~" \ 
The Format1on 1 of Two Rival Governments in Korea 
The Tempo1ary Gommission c~uld not gain access !to 
North Korea, but proceeded to supervise elections on M•y 10, 
! 
1948, .1n -South Korea. The -election in South Korea res~lted 
in the majority 0£ seats in th _e National Assembly goin~ to 
i 
the National .Assoqiation for the Rapid Realization of ~rean . 
. I 
Independence ( led by Syngman Rhee)• The Commission bbs~-rved 
that "only rightist parties and groups h~d officially sµp • 
I 
ported the eleetio s." It also observed that, since th ,e 
elections were restricted to South Korea, they "were opposed 
by some political parties and kindred organiiations in ~hat 
2 
area . tt 
In the meantime, according to the Commission•s i:>est 
I information (it had no direct contact with North Korea-}, a 
1 
u. N. Secretariat, Research Section, Background 
Papers, No. 62, 18 May 1950, PP• 8.9 . 
2 
u. N. Seeztetariat, Research Section, Backgroun4 
Papers, No. 62, 18 May 1950, pp. 9•11. 
I• 
I 
I 
l 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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rival government had been formed under General Kim Il $ung . 
This government of the North claimed that 1,080 representa 0 
I 
· tives fr ·om south Korea had met in Raeju in North Korea an4 
had elected 360 Aissembly.men. The 360 As&emblymen elected by 
the aelegates from the South combined with the 212 Nort!h 
. Korean Assemblym.en claimed to constitute the Supreme People •a 
Assembly; and, on September 9, 1948, they established the I . 
Government of the 1People's Republic of Korea. ln Octob~r, 
the U. ..S.R. recognized the northern government, the De~u::>• 
crat1c People• s Republl _c of Korea, and later it w·as recbg~ 
' n1z ·ed by some ten other states. In February, 1949, 1 t , , 
applied for membe~a.hip in the United Hat1ons 1 but was· r~.- : 
. l r jected. 
1 
The Tempo~ary Commission, in ita ~eport to the 
General Assemblyi called attention to the tact that a &$pa -
rate government had been established in the north without 
consul ti~ that c·obmi~sicm and recommended that the gov~rn-
r • 
ment in the .south be recognized by the Asserably. It ur ·ged . 
I , . 
unification or the country as a neeessary prerequisite to .. , 
. . ' . . . 
the withdrawal of ~he occupying forces tr w, inter~ecin• war 
2 
we:re to be avoided . 
1 
U'. N. SeoFetariat, Research Section, Backgrouni 
,apers, No. 62, 18 May 1950, pp. 11-1,3. 
2 
Ibi'-\., P • 1.3. 
-
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. I . 
The General Assembly established a new Commission 
(•the six states that had refused to partieipate in the work 
of the Interim Committee again refused to vote, reiterating 
their objections) and announced the establishment of a law• 
tul government {the government of the Republic of Korea) 
1 . 
"hav-ing effectite eontrol and jurisdiction over that part of 
Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and 
I 
consult and ~n whieh the great majority of the people of all 
Korea reside; tl::\at this Government la based on elections 
which were · a valid expression of the · free will of th elec-
torate of that p'art of Korea and whiehwere observed by the 
Temporary Commission; and that this is_ the only such Govern - · 
1 
ment in Korea. 11 
The Govenment or the Republic of Korea was granted 
full reeognition by the Unit .ad States in January, 1949. It 
has also been re .,ognized by the National Government of China, 
France , the United Kingdom, Philippine s, and other states . 
Formal appl1cat1Jn for membership in the United Nations w·as 
made by the Repu~lic or Korea in January, 1949, but was re -
l je c ted .by a negative vote of the Soviet Union, although it 
U . N . G. A. \ Off. Rec., Plenary Meetings , J r,d Session, 
Part 1 , Annexes tb the Summary Records of Meetings, 1948,. 
D00 A/788/ pp • .549-51, Par 2 of the Resolut ion adopted by . 
the General As sembly at th · 187th Plenary meeting 12 December 
1948~ Par. 9 of ~he same esolution recommen ded that "Mem-
ber States and othe r natio s, in es t ablishing their · relations 
with the Governme~t of Kor a, take into .consi de:ration t4e 
faets set out in Par. 2 of the p~esent resolution . " 
I 
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met all the requirements for acceptance by that body with 
1 
nine votes in its ' favor . 
I 
The Witndrawal of Occupation Forces 
I 
The United Nations Commission observed and verified 
the withdr awal of American occupation forces, which was com-
pleted on June 29, 1949. Military material was not with-
drawn but was tr➔sferred to the Korean security forces • . An 
Ameriean Military Advisory Group of 500 men remained 1n order 
2 
to give advice to the Korean Military Academy. 
I 
The Commission signified its readiness to offer its 
. I : .. 
services, as dire~ted by the General Assembly resolution 0£ 
December 12, 1948, to observe the withdrawal of U.S . 8. R. 
occupation forces . No reply was received to its request from 
! 
the Soviet Government, but according to Tass, the Soviet .News 
b 3 Agency, Soviet eva uation · was completed on December 25, 1946. 
The Oommission•s ,Gonelusions of July, 1949 
By July, 1~49, the United Nations Oommission was 
able to summarize the results of its ·experienees in Korea . 
It stated that the \Government of the Republ ·ic . of ~orea had 
maintained a negat~ve attitude with respec .t to the Commission• s 
l 
u. N .• Secr,etariat, Research Section, Background 
Papers, No. 62·, 18 May 1950, p . 15. -
2 . - l 
Ibid . , .p • .t9. 
3- ' 
Ibid . , . p . ~O. .On ·September 18, 1948, the Foreign 
Ministry or-the Soviet Union had notified the United States 
· Government that the evacuation of Soviet troops from North 
Korea would be completed at the end of December, 1948. 
l 
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endeavors to st blish contact with the North . Th Commis-
sion felt that the Republic was still politically divided 
internally by a breach stemming from the differences of 
views over the elections of ay 10, 1948. ?he Oommlssion 
felt that tho goViernm nt had made no attempt to heal the 
breach and that, as a result of the activities of the North, I . 
it had adopted ~omewhat brutal attitud 1n its conduct , 
- I 
which had engendered suspicion of thos who ere ind~pendent 
or critical i~ sptr1t . The Commission maintained that the 
Korean problem was basically one phase ot the world • wide 
antagonism bet eem the United States and the u.s .S.R., and 
I 
that no substanti41 progress toward the achievement of unity 
. I 
in Korea could be made without an understanding on the prob -
1 
lem by those two 11io ers . 
I . 
The Renewal of the Oomm!ssion, October 21; 1949 
When the Opmm1ss1on applied to the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee for continuation of the Commission with enlarged 
I . 
powers, a Philip pine proposal was adopted. to invite the 
I dele gation of the Republic of Korea to participate, without 
vote, in the discu:,:3sions of the Committee . Represents.ti vea 
'' 
of North Korea wer excluded since they refused to recognize , 
I 
or cooperaie with the United Nations Commission on Korea . 
I 
The u.s .s.R. maintained that the United States had created a 
l 
U. N. Secretariat, Research Section, Background 
Papers, No. 62, 18 May 1950, pp . 20-22 . 
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puppet government , in South Kore and pressed for the im-
mediate terminati r n of the Commission . · The United States 
l.ll"ged continuation of the Commission, ·warning of the grow-
ing danger of a -ncruel civil war . " On October 21, 1949, the 
GeneJ?al Assembly- ·approved the renewal of the Commission with 
slightly xpanded powers and with some alteration of purpose . 
The firat ·task of the renewed Commission was to "observe 
report any develo Jments · which might lead to or other ise 
1 
vol ve military con~liat in Korea . tt 
1 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
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I 
I 
I 
U. N. Secretariat, Research Section, Background 
Papers; No. 62, 18 May 1950, pp . 22-29 . 
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CHAPTER IV 
ARMED CONFIJ CT IN KORFA AND THE A.PPFA.LS FOR 
COLLECT! ACTION: TSE RESOLUTIONS OF 
! 
E 25 AND JUNE 27, 1950 
The ition of the Seeuri ail 
anuary unt Auest 
At the ti st meet11'lg ot the Seeurity Oouneil on 
January 10, . 1950_. the U,.s$s.R . brought to the attention ef 
. . ' ! . 
the Counoi l . requests .fl'om the Central People ta Government 
. . · I . 
of the People 1e R~publie 0£ China . These ~equests statea. 
that the governme~t ot the Peopl 18 Republie of Ghina held 
the presence of Hthe delegates of the Chinese Kuomintang 
. . 
reactionary remnant o11quett (Nationalist Chinese dele~tes) 
in the Security Oo nc1l to be illegal• and asked for the 
expulsion cf those \ delegates . The· u. s~S.R. then submitted 
a :resolution to th Council calling for the ·exclusion ct 
nthe representative ef the Kuomintang group , " The 'Uits. s .R. 
took the position t1at the Kuomintang delegate ;repttesenteci 
neither China nor ~he. Ohinese people and (ilJ. ve notice tbit t if 
the Council failed to t.ake appropriate aetion, the u.s.s itR• 
ould not participate in the work of the Council as long as 
l 
that delegate bad ot been excluded . 
I 
. ] . U,.N.S.C. orf, R.ee•; 5th Yt>., 459th Meeting • 
10 J'anua ry 1950 t N·o.. 1, pp . 1•3 • 
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The Yugoslav delegate supported . the .Soviet reso_lution, 
pointing to the fac 't that . five governme nts represented . on the 
Couneil recognized the new govemment Qf China and five 
governments recognized the old one. He stated that the in-
creasing number br recognit ions was due to the fact that it 
had ,become obvious that the sovereign will of the Chinese 
. I . . . 
people had been expressed in the establishment of the Govern-
1 
.. ment of Mao Tse-tung. Nevertheless , the Soviet resolution was 
rejected, and the representative or the u.s.s.R. left the 
I I l 
. . 
Council chamber with t;he statement that the u.s.s. R. woulditnot 
. recognize as leg~l any d:eciai<>n of the Security Council 
adopted with the parti cipatio n of the Kuomintang group," and 
2 
. would "not be guip ed by any such decisions." The ~oviet 
dele g~te did not return to the Council until August 1, 1950. 
The June 25 Resolution 
On June 2$,, 19.50, the Security Oouneil convened at 
the request of the United States to cons i der a reported 
3 
"aggre,.:ssion upon the Republic of Kerea •. " At _ three o•clock 
- r ~ , 
of that morning, 
0
El"nest Gross; the American representative, 
had read a ~asage to _the President ot th~ Securitr Council 
l .. -
· _ U.N.s.c. prr. Rec . , .5th Yr., 460th Meeting, 
12 January 1950, No. 2, pp. 2 ... 4. 
2
Ib1d., 46~st Meeting, 13 January 1950, No. 3, 
PP• 9-10.- \ . 3 . 
.!!?!;!•, 47J~d Meeting, 25 June 1950, No. 15, p. 1. 
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which stated: I 
The Unit~ States Ambassador t o the Republic of 
Korea ~s i~ormed the Department of State that North 
Korean force~ invaded the territory of the Republ1e 
of Korea at several points in the early morning houre 
. of June 25 (Korean time) • . 
.Pyongyang Radio under the control of the North 
Korean regime , it is reported, has broat:l,east a declare. • 
tion ot we.r eJgainst the Republic of Korea effect1 ve 
9 P .M. , E . D .• 'I;~, June 24 · . 
Upon the frgent request of my Government, I a sk 
you to call a~ innned1ate meeting of the Security 
Council of' the United Nations.l 
. At the o+ning of the meeting of the Security 
Council a cablegram from the United Notions Commission on 
Korea was introdu t ed, which reads 
Governmen of Repu~11o of Korea states that about 
04 .0 0 hrs . 25 June ~ttacks were launched in strength 
by North Kor e'n forces all along the thirty - eighth 
parallel • • - .. ·· Pyongyang rl!ldio allegation at 13 , 35 
hrs . of South Korean invasion across paral l el during 
night declared entS,rely false by Presid .ent and Foreign 
Minister in ocl>urse-of conference w1 th Commission 
members and Ptainoipal Secl'etary . l l egations als o 
stated People•s Army instructed. repulse invading 
forces by dee~sive counter attack and placed responsi -
bility for oo-qse quences on South Korea • • •• 
• • • • • • • , ••• • •••• i •• . •••••••••• 
Commission wished to draw attention of Secrete.ry-
1 -General to serious situation developing which i~ 
assuming charalcter of f'ull - scale war and may endanger 2 
the maintenan e of international peace and security •••• 
The United States representative then submitted a 
resolution which called upon the North Korean authorities to • 
. . . . I . ·-. .. - . . . . . ·- . -
l . -- 1· . 
U.N.s.c . 'Off • . Rec., 5th Yr.; 473rd Meeting , 
25 June ~MO, No. 15• P• 1,n , 
;!'.bid • ., p -. 2, n . 'l'h.e cablegram was da. ted. June 25 , 
1950 . 
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cease hostiliti~s and to withdraw their armed forces to the 
thirty-eighth p~rallel. The resolution also called upon "all 
Members to rendf3ir every assistance to the United Nations 1n 
the execution ot this resolution and to refrain from giving 
assistance to the Nor t h Korean authorities." The cautious 
response of the United Kingdom to the American resolution is 
noteworthy . Sir Gladwyn Jebb held to the view that a certa in 
I 
amount of restraJnt was necessary and that "the Security 
Council should not at this moment take action which might be 
beyond the bounds of the evidence which has been placed at 
its disposal by its own Commission 1n Korea . '' The Yugoslav 
dele gate proposed that the Council enlarge the bounds of 
evidence by gran~ing an opportunity for a representative of 
Nor th Korea to pr.esent his case. Until that transpired, he 
I 
said, final judgment should be withheld . After calling 
attention to the fact that the Council had heard the repre-
sentative of South Korea, Mr. Nincic introduced a resolution 
I 
that would have grant ed a similar privilege to a representa-
1 
tive of North Korea . 
The A.meridan resolution was adopted by nin e votes in 
favor• Yugoslavia abstaining, and Russia absent . 
U.N.s . c . ,orr . Rec . , 5th Yr . , 473rd Meeting, 
25 June, 1g50, No. I 15, PP• 4- 15 . 
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The Yugoslav resolution was rejected, six votes against, three 
l 
~bstentions, and one absent . 
Recommendations of the United Nations 
Cowmission on Korea · 
Oh June f7, .1950, the Security Oounc11 l.'let to r nGw 
its consideration on the "-Complaint of Aggression upon the 
Republic of. Korea." · Four c.e.blegrams had been received from 
. I 
the 9ommiss1on ·in r ply to a request which had been included 
in the Seeurity douneil's resolution of June 2$. 
The fiJ1>st cablegr m stated that North Korean 
advane shad ore~ted a dangerou situation with possibilities 
of r pid deterioration, and, in the light of past experience, 
the a·omm.1s1:don wa convinced that North Korea would neither 
heed the Couneil'' resolution nor accept its good ofi'ices . 
It suggested that \ the Council either invite both parties to 
agree. on a neutral mediator to negoti te peace, or that the 
Council request Member Governments to undertake immediate 
mediation. 
'!'he last cablegram stated that th$ Commission had met 
to consider the litest reports on hostilities an4 the results 
l 
U. N.s.c . Off'. Ree ., 5th Yr ., 473rd Meeting, 
25 June, 1950, No. ' 1$, pp . 16-18. The procedure or the 
Security Council Ofilled tor a vote on the American resolution 
first . Immediately after the presentation of, the Yugoslav 
resolution, the delegate of Norway, Mr. Sunde, stated that 
his eountry would support the American resol. ·•i.tion. The Council 
then moved to vote on the American resolution immediately. , 
There was no opportunity given to discuss the Yugoslav resolu-
tion which was put Ito a vote af'ter the Council had adopted 
the one proposed by the United States. 
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of "direct observation along the parallel by UNOOK military 
observers over Pier1od endin g forty-eight hours before 
I 
host111 ties began . " The · Commission's view on the basis of 
that evidence was that the Northern Regime was carrying~out 
a ".well - planned , concerted and ru11 ... scale invasion ef South 
I 
KoreaK; that the "south Korean forces were deployed on a 
. I 
wholly def nsive basis"; and ,that the South Korean rerees 
~were taken comp+etely by surprise, as they had no reason to 
' 1 
believe fpom intell1g nc 
1 
sources that invasion was i nunlne~t . " 
I 
The American Posi tilbn of June 27 
Warre n Austin, speaking for the United State.s before 
the SeoUPity COU90il, called attention to the report of the 
United Nations Oommission for Korea which confirmed that the 
armed invasion of'1 the Republic of" Korea. was continuing . He 
noted that the Seburity Council's call for a cessation of 
hostilities had been broadcast to the North Korean authori-
ties; but that t~y had completely disregarded it . The con-
u.N.s.o. lorr. Rec., 5th Yr. , 474th Meeting , 
27 June 1950, No. 16, ;P• 2. The last report of the Com-
mis s ion cited here {S/1507) d serves some special attention. 
No date was given in the Security Council Records to indicate 
the time it was s nt , but, according · to Qther records, the 
date was June 26 (Korean date) . (U. N. G. A. orr. Rec . , 5th 
Session, Report of the United Nations Commission on I{orea 
19 December 19br9 to 4 September 1950, Supp . 16., New York 1950, 
p . 3 . ) Hewever, the ''on the spot" obse rvations by the m111 ta.ry 
observers of the ti . N. Commission terminated 48 hours prior 
to the commencement of" hostilities . Therefore, in this report 
the information cohcerning aetiv1tie~ at the time or commence-
ment of hostilitie~ was drawn by the Commission from Govern-
ment of Korea sources . 
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tinued armed attack upon the Republic of Korea was then, 
aecord1ng to Aus
1
tin, S.."'1. attack upon the United Nations 
itself . 
Sinc ·e t* mo:st impoPtant provisions of the Oharter 
were those outlawing aggressive war, and sinee these were 
precisely the prbvisions which the · North Korean authorities 
had violated; th 1 plain duty of the Securit~ Oouncil was to 
invoke stringent sanctions to restore international peace . 
S'inoe the Republi\e of Korea had appealed to the United 
Nations for protection, ~ustin was happy and proud to re• 
port that the Uni lted S-tates was prepared, aa a loyal member 
of the United Nat ons, to furnish assistance to the Republic 
of Korea . Accordingly, he submitted a draft resolution for 
the Council to ooµsider as the next step to restore orld 
peace . The resolib.tion called attention to the appeal of the 
Republic of Kor-ea 1and recomm.ended "that the Members of the 
United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic o:f 
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to 
l 
restore internati9nal peace • and security in the area . tt 
After submitting the resolution, Austin read a state -
ment whieh the Pre ·ident o:f the United States had · made that 
da y (June 27th) . ~n his statement the President took the 
view that the attabk upon Korea had made it "plain beyon9-- all 
doubt" that Gommun+sm had "pass d beyond the use of subversion 
l 
to conquer independent nations,' and ould no "use rmed 
invasion and iar•" He made it clear. also, that the United 
States did not J gard the attack on South Korea as simply 
North Korean enterprise; nor the American inte -rest i n Korea 
as detached from the American interest in China . Thus, he 
de-els.red that since the Communists had de.fi ed th.a order which 
the Security Cofcil of ~he United Nations had 1 sued to pre -
serve international .peace and security, rtthe occupation of 
. I 
Formosa ·by Communist fo;rces would be a direct threat to the 
security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces 
performing their \ lawful and necessary f'unot1ons in that are ." 
'therefore, he ha ordered "the Seventh Fleet to prevent any 
attack on Formo .sa" EUld "the Chinese Government on Formosa to 
cease all air and sea operations against the .mainland . " The 
I • 
Seventh Fleet was to aee th t his ordere concerning Formosa 
were carrie~ out, and the determination of the future status 
of Formosa "must await the restoration of security in the 
Facit"io, a peace settlement with Japan , or consideration by 
the United Nation s." 
As supporting measures for this Pacific security 
action, Preside nt Truman revealed that he bad directed that 
"United States forces in the Philippin~s be strengthened and 
I 
that military assistance to the Philippine Government be 
. I 
accelerated . 1! He 1had also directed that "acceleration of 
military assistance to the forces of France and the associated 
states of' Indo - China" be provided, together with "ttie dispatch 
I 
l 
l 
I 
of a military mi ' sion 
1 
with those force • 11 
to provide olose working relations 
Th~ Pos~tion of Yugoslav!~ 
After Aj 1 tin had offered the American draft resolu-
tion, the Yugos 
1
v delegate reiterated his r-equest tor $ 
program of mediatioth Be stat$d that the w· r in Korea w. a 
' 1 ' ' . 
direct consequenee of the gener 1 tension in the post •VJ'$~ 
~orld 1 'hieh ste4nec1 .f'l."om the })1'$etice, n·wtd ly applied after 
the Second World r , or dividing carte.in geographical x-eas 
into spheres of 1rluenee or interest . " He likened this 
r,olioy · to th.at to which his own nd other Ba lktan countries 
. I 
bacl been subject~. 
!he Y\lgOllrV dele!!!lte called , attention to th fact 
that the United N t1ona Commi:asion on Kol'ea md recommended 
the e.doptf.on of' procedure of med1at .1on in 1ts cable of 
J'1ne 26, 1950 . xJ order to f'e.cilit te this process, he 
proposed once morJ that the 0oune11 inVite the gov rnment 
of the People• s R public of Korea (North Korea) to send a 
repl'eeente.t1'Ve to \the head.quarte ·r$ o.t the United Nations 
1mmed1atel'y.- - w1tb hll poweJ-$ to pa:rticipatf.t 1n the procedure 
of mediation. 
2 
\ 
J 
Other Attitudes Express d ih th Security Council 
Th moderate character of the Yugoslav proposal 
seemed to embra e a view which was similar to that which the 
Security Oounoi~ had taken on previous oe·casions in handling 
international disputes culminating in armed eonfliet .. It 
soon became appa:rent, however , that the atmosphere in the 
Oouncil was to become one of condemnation of the North 
Korean authorities. Previous procedure seemed to be for- . 
gotten in an effort to punish a group which had flouted the 
·authorit y of' the United Nations . 
The next spokesman after th& Yugoslav delegate was 
the representative from the Republic of Korea (South Korea) . 
Re made a fervent appeal through the Clouneil to all members 
I 
of the United Nations to participate actively in expelling 
0 the marauding forces" which had invaded his country . The 
dele gations of France and the United Kingdom then spoke in 
favoP of the United States resolution . They were followed 
by the Chinese Nationalist delegation _ which $pok out stro ngly 
against a policy of mediation . The Ohinese Nationalist repre-
sentative stated that an off'er of' mediation under the circum-
stances would only serve to condone an act of aggression . 
'l'he -event in Korea , he stated, had been established by the 
Commiss ion as a c ear ease of unprovoked aggeession, and the 
invader had defied the authority of the Security Oouneil . As 
for Formosa, it ~s looked upon by the Chinese people he said 
in the same light as the other provinces of China . He 
expressed his gratitude, therefore, for "the decision of the 
United States Government to use its fleet to prevent en 
attack on PormosJ ." The Chinese people" he stated, ttexpect 
their ~overnment \to utilize the :tuunan and material resource, 
of Formosa tQ l'e J ,ver the terr! torial 1ntegr1 ty and the 
I 1 
political independenee and freedom of China , " Cuba, Norway; 
and EcW\dOP added \ their support to the United. States resolu • 
tion . · I 
The meeting was then 8ttspended for tive hours 1n 
I 
order twt the delega tee of Egypt and India might reeei ve 
instructions r:r-ornl their governments . The 1nstruetions were 
. I 
not received , however, and when the United States reselution 
was put to a vote it was adopted seven ~o one (Yugoslavia 
against). '1'wo did not vote (Egypt and India), and one 
member was absent l(u.s . s .R. ). The Yugosli\v amendment was 
I . 2 
rejected with seven votes against it . 
The J'.,Ji ti ons or Egrpt ~lld ll)dla 
By June 3d, 1950,. the delegates ot Egypt am lm1a I -· . 
bad received instr ' etions from their governments and were 
able to conve~ the v1$we of their governments to the Council. 
Egypt stated that he would be.ve abstained from voting on 
I the resolution -adopted by the Council on Ju.ne 27, had she 
1950, 
u 
No. 2 . 
_ I . 
Ibid • ; pp 
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been ab le to parti cipate in t he voti ng . The reas ons given 
fo r Egptis posi ion were: first, that the -conflict under 
eon$id eration ~a~ a "ne phase in the series of d1vergenee e 
be t ween the 1est~rn and eastern blocs, 8 divergences whieh 
themselves threatened world pea..ce and security; and , secondly , 
that thel'e had been "several cases of . eggro .ssio n against 
peoples and v10Jt1o ns of the sovereignty and u.ni ty of the 
I 
terrttor1es or State Members of the United Nations . " On 
. . I previous occasions ,. Egypt held ; when such aggressions e.r.d 
violations had b 1en submitted to the United Nation$ , the 
latter bad not taken any action to put an end to them as it 
l 
had done now in the ea s e of Korea . 
the repre l entative of India atated that the Indian 
I 
Cabinet had f'ou:nd it necessary to speni two days considering 
t he resolution , sino~ India was so near t e scene of' contlict 
and would have to give most serious eons id eration to the 
I 
implications and ~ossible consequences of implementing the :re-
1 
solution . After this deliberation the lndie.n government bad 
·I 
de _cided to ''accept" the res olution , with the qual1f"ication 
that tbia did not mean any change in India•$ foreign policy . 
India was opposed to ant attempt to settle intern.a. t1ona l 
disputes by resort t o force , nd felt thllt ttthe he.lt1ng of 
a ggre$sion and the \ quick restoration of peaceful conditions " 
were "essent .ial prelud,es to a satisfactory settlement . " The 
U. N. s . c . prr . Reo., 5th Yr ., 475th Meeting ~ 30 June 
1950 , No .• '17, P•- 2. . 
I 
government of India hoped that . 0 even , at this stage" it 
might be possible to ~•put an end to · the fighting and to 
1 
settle the dispu e by mediation . " 
The Pbsiti,on of the u.s.s .R. and 
,_. , Other ·c·omnnmist Oountri~s 
I . . Since the Soviet Union was absent - from the ·S&o\U"ity 
. I 
Counc11 -meetings \during this period., her views were aought _ 
through diplomatic channels . -On .June 27, 1950, the American 
Emba-ssy at Mosco~ commun:ioated with -the Soviet Foreign 
Minister . 
\· 
The replYi from Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko 
statei that . the ~oviet , ,Gove"Jrnment had ascertained that nthe · 
events . taking : pla f e , in, -Korea .were provoked by , an attack by _ 
forces of the SoU:rh Kor>ean author! ties o~ _border ' regions .. of 
No't'•th Korea"; there -fore, the responsibility r ·or · those events 
I 
rested upon the South Korean authorities and those who backed I . . 
them . · Secondly., said Gromyko, "the S011'iet Governmep;t with -
dl'ew it .s - troops ttom Korea earlier than the . Government of 
0
the 
Unite d States and thereby confirmed its traditional principle 
of non~interferenje in the internal a£fe.1rs of other states . " 
'11he Soviet government, added Gromyko, would eontinue to 
adhe~e to "the ·pr1 ! eiple of th~ impermiss1bility of inter• 
terence by foreign powers_in the internal af f airs of Korea . " 
. I 
Thirdly ., the Sovief Government was quite wi :lling to take part 
l 
U.N.s.c. Off . Rec ., 5t h Yr . ,. 475th Meeting, 
30 June, 1g30~ Ne. 17, PP• 2-3 . 
I 
in the deliberations of the security Council, but was being 
prevented from doing so bee use of the position taken by 
the government o:6' ·the United States, which prec lwied the 
admission of ChiI¥1 ( Commu.ri1s t China) to the Councfl as a 
permanent -member.. The exclusion or communist Chin from 
the Council, according to the Soviet Union, made it 1mpos-
ible tor the Security Council to make decisions having 
le l roroe .
1 
\ 
Other -Gommunist eou.ntrie .s (except Yugoslavia) took 
a pos1t1on similar to that of the Soviet Union in denounoing 
the Seeu~ity Ooun~il re olutions of June 25 and June 27 a~ 
illegal . The Minister of Foreign ffairs of the Korean 
People's Democrat'c Republic (North K.orea) sent a cablegram, 
dated June 29 , 1950 , . to the United Nat1ons, st ting that his 
gover-nment did "nqt recognize the discussion and decisions. 
B 
of the Security 09uneil on the Korean question as lawful . 
I . 
Ame~i~an _Polic{ pn . t}!e Use of •rmeq F.orce 
- to tiles ore _ reace in Kor~a · 
I At the meeting of the Security Council on June 30, 
1950, the American \ delega t1on gave a summary of the steps 
being taken by the \United States to enfoYce the Secu rity 
Council decision . That morning., said the American representative , 
l o I 
u .Q. Depe.4tment of State Bulletin, . tJ.s .s .R. Responds 
to Re9ruests f'or Med1ation, Vol. XXIII, No. 575, Jul y !0 , l950, 
released to the press June 29 . 
2 U.N.s.c. Of£, Rec., 5th Yr. , 474th Meeting, 30 June 
. 1950, No •. 17, P • a, 
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I 
the resident of the Unite Stat~s had met With Congressio~..nl 
leaders, the Secreta.ry of Defense, the See:retary of State, _and 
I 
the Joint Chiefs o:t Staff, nd bad revie ed the si -tua tion in 
Korea • In keepi g w1 th the request of the United Ma tions 
I 
Security Council~ the President had announced that he had 
authorized. the udi ted States Air Foree to conduct missions 
on specific mili+ry targets 1n North Kore wherever mlli• 
tarily neoassa:ry .• \ ]le had also ordeioed a naval blockade of 
the enti:re Korean ooast. Furthermore, he had authorized 
General MacArthur \ to use certain supporting groun~ u..n:tts . 
Aeeompany ng this umrnary, was a l?&ference by Austin 
toe st~tement by the Secretary or State on the previous 
day ( June a9 >, 
The Pres1 ~nt hes enunciated the policy of thl,s 
Governme,nt to do 1 ts utmost to uphold the se.ncti ty 
Gf' the Oba.rte~ o.f the United Nations and the rule of 
law among nations . W& are, the ref ore, in eonf'orm1 ty-
w1 th the resolutions of the Security Council of 
25 June and· 27 June, g1 ving air .and se$ support to 
the t:roop of the Kol'ean Government ~ Tb!s action., . · 
pursuant to t:,e Security Council resolutions, ts 
solely for tht ~pose of restoring the Republic of 
Ko~ea to its status prior to the 1nvas1on from the 
North and of :t♦.e•establiabing the peace broken by 
that aggreasiJn . The action or this Government in 
Ko~ea is take11' :1.n suppot-t of the authority of the 
United Nation~ . It is taken t~ restore peace nd 
sec'Q.ri ty in tJ:te Pacific area . 
u.N . s.o. lort .. Rec.,. 5th Yr •• 4'15tli Me.eting ,. 30June 
1950, No. 1'7, p . m. · It !s interesting to not the .implied · 
lim1 tation plaeed 1on the eommi tment or American . fo:rees• 
"'!'his aetion • ., .,r is solely for the purpose of restoring the 
Republie of' Kore a ~o its status prior to the invasion frotn 
the North and of re-establishing the peace brok n by the.t 
aggression . u Lster ~ol1c1 displayed a much broader scope . 
I 
CHAP':f ··_v 
FURTHEtt DEVELOP ffiNT$. IN TSE KOREAN ACTION 
AND THE INTf;RVE!lT!ON OF TH.E 
PEO~LE ' S RE·PU LI C OF' CHINA 
American Intervention in Korea and Communist 
.. Reactions 1to the June . 27 ' · ·Resolution . 
On Wednesday, June 28 , 19-50 (Tole.yo time), the 
hea dquarters of General Douglas ·MacArthur in Tokyo 
announced that the Unit ed States was actively int erven:J.ng 
in the Korean eonflict . General '-'acArthur state d that a 
l 
t•small advanced echelon" f rom his headquarters had been 
I 
est ablished i n Kor , a , and t hat Far East Air For ces and 
elements of naval for0es under his command were conducting 
combat mis sions south . of the thirty-eighth parallel. The 
oper .ations were tt1n sup port of the Korean Re-public" whose 
I 
government, . the report stated., had been reinstalled in Seoul 
I 
after armoured spearheads from Nort hern forces h ad been 
isolated. The announcement from Tokyo also state d that four 
North Kor -ean fi ghters had been shot down by United States 
plane s when they had attempted to interfer e with the evacua-
tion of women and children depe nd ents of se ·veral Unite d States 
Missions f rom Kimpo air f ield., near Se oul . Operation s of 
American fo rces wer 1e apparently restricted ·to activities sout h 
l . 
I T'nis is rx-pm a newspaper ac count . It necessarily 
lacks the precise description wh ic h could be obtained f rom 
confidential mi lita:ry re cords . 
-4-6-
of the thirty..,e:t.~hth parallel , , On June 28 the initial drive 
l 
into South Kore 1hB.d ap rently b~~~ checked. 
,P:r-estden · Truman's orde'I"> of assi.stsne e to t;he South 
oreen rovees was promptly 1~e orted in th . SovHlt newspa.pe~ 
I Pravda . . Aeeord .ing to a June 88 London !lccount of a MotHlGW 
broa east;, Pravda \ had said that "the Truman order signified 
I 
that the United S~ates Gove:mment ms taken a direct act of 
aggress · on agains the Korean people's democratic republic 
2 
snd against the p ople's r publi or China . " I . 
Tn North Ko::rean government continued to .::i.ssert :1.te-
original position that the South Korean forces bsd precipi-
tated the attaclt. l According to' :reports, , awil ble to the 
New York ,1mes # Fl'emie:r Kim ll Sung accused President 
Syngtnan Rhee' go "3rnment of taxing the pe&ple to a point ot 
starva .tion in ord r to bu:i.ld up its W$r potential , and Rhee 
was blamed for "failure to unify the eountry peaeeably . " 
I . . . 
T~e democratic frfnt in NoFth l(orea had ma.de several prop osals 
.for unification , the last of which had been issued on . June 7 . 
As for the United Na_tions decisions, th e government of' North 
Kc,rea issued a st tement that tb.ey ere illegali first.,. 
because the Demoe1atie People•s . Republic of Nort h Kor~a baa 
not been represen~ed when i ta af.fe.itts had been discussed; 
second, because tlie Soviet Union and ( Cmmnunist) China had 
not participated ]n the Security Gounc1.l del i berations . 
New Yor.~ ~ im~s; .Tune 28 .. 1950 1 P • 1, eol . 5 ., 2 . 
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On the s.econd po nt, the North Korean statement observed 
. I 
that the United ations Charter requiiied umfnimity of the 
I . · .· · · l 
I five pe~manent m~mbers on matters Qf substance. 
Although !re 'ports fr om Tokyo on June 28 had given · hope 
that Seoul could jbe saved, on June 29 Tokyo announced that 
Seoul had fallen Ito the North Koreans the day be.fore . Tokyo 
also announced, In June 29, that the South ~orean A:rmy had 
rallied below th river south of Seoul with the aid of 
2 
· "swarming fleets of United St~tes wEu•planeE;." On June 30 1 
President T7uma.n ru thorized the use of Vni tad States ground 
forces to i-epel he invaders in South Kotte.a, the use of 
United States mi!itacy aiPcraft against military objectives 
I . . 
north of the tbir 1ty-e1ghth parallel,. am a complete bloelaade l 3 
or the Korean eoa !st by the Navy. en· the se.me day it was re• 
ported the.t the •iuth Korean:,3 bad virtually .given up fi gh ting 
after North Korea , tanks bad broken through their defense at 
· the Ban River, o , side of Se oul. Amer1e~n troops (estimated 
at 11 000) were fl n 1.nto Pusan, far -·south .o.f the b~ttleline , 
4 
i n ord er to brin ~ tutu:re help to the South Koreans~ 
The Qffer bt Chinese Nationalist Tr _oo Iii· 
Or oree · 
. On June 2
1
,. the government of the Republic of China 
had received a cbmmunicat1on from the Seerete.ry General ot 
the United Nations ~equesting it to ru..~nish assistance to 
I 
the Republic of Korea in ac cordance w:tth the resolution passed I -
by the Security council on June 27. The Chinese Nationalist 
. I -
government accordingly offered" on cTune 30, to sv.pply 
33,000 troo p$, tb be ready :for embarkation in five days. 
The United State government held tbat. in light of the threat 
of invasion of T iwan (Formosa) by 09mmunist forces from the 
ms.inland, it woui'.Ld be desirable for General MacArthur's head~ 
I • 
quarters to hol~ discussions with the Ohinese military 
authorl ties on T~i• an regarding it $ defense prior to ~ommi t• 
ting .any of its -!troops to Ko:rea •
1 
I -
Oontin~t1on of the aonf11ct in _Korea 
The defsnses south of Seoul crumbled before a drive 
I .• . 
by four North K -re1ln columns . It was reported tlwt at least 
mvo of the eol,ns were led by tanks, and that the situation 
on the front be.4 become serious. General Me.cArthur"s head ... 
quartev-s announced that British and United States naval 
forces off the east: c.oast had sunk five or six North Korean 
2 
motor torpedo b . ts. On July 4, !t was reported that 
American troops bad gone into action r or the f"1rst time on 
. 3 
the night of Ju}r 3. 
The North Korean government sent a bitter protest to 
I 
the United Nations., char ging that American intervention had 
obstructed the unity 0£ t he Korean people, but t hat in spite 
of t h is intervention the Korean people would rally under t he 
banner of. the Kore an People's Democrati c Repub lic in their 
"holy war for the freedom, unity and independence of their 
l I 
native land.," 
On July 5·, the Tokyo reports indicated that the 
stru ggle for Sout h K<;>I"ea had begun in earnest, with United 
State soldiers le ellin g an artill ery barrage against a 
I 
North Kore an ta nk -led t st and "considerable naval e.ct:tvity 0 
in the east, on the :iro-rt h Korean brid geh ead in t h e S mch ok area . 
on July 7, 1950, the u.s.s .R. charged in a note sent 
to the United St at es Embass y in tlos cow that the Ameri can 
blockade of Kore s lwas a "new aet of aggression." The Russian 
note ,,as in re ply 1to one sent by tbe United State s ., on 
July 4, Which had informed the u.s.s.R. that the United States 
had established a 1nav al blockade o.f Korea, 11in ke ~ping with 
th e United Nations Securit~ Council 's req uest f or sup port to 
the Republic of Kdrea in repelling North Korea n invaders and 
· I 3 
restoring pe a ce in orea."' In its re ply the ovi et ~overnment 
2 
stated that it wou1d conside r t he Go ern ment of the United States 
res ponsi ble f or an~ dam ge to its interes t which migh t be 
l 
New Yor k W.imes, July 4 , 1950, P• 4, col . 3 . 
2 
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I 
l 
caused 1n. c-onnec ion with the blockade . About the same ti me 
it bees.mo app$.:r'eb.t that the United St-ates gove~nment was . in,.. 
ten s~ fy .in g its 'ef :rort to prevent shipm ents 'Qf oil and a>ther 
war materia l s fr m. re achi ng No;rth Koree.n sy mpeth izere. In 
keeping wtth the l.inore&sed Uni ted Na t ions participa.tion in 
the Korean oonfl ct, a move was made to establish a ·unif :led 
. . I . 
comman . under t he leadership of the lJnitep. State$ . 
. . I 
~e _Ju.lz 1 . e ·solution; '?ll.e Reco mmendation for a 
Un1fi,ed omm~nd Under the Un - tea State$ 
Whan the !Security Council met on July 7 , 1950, Franc e 
and the l!nited K ngdom introduced a res olution designed ,to 
coordinate the ~J t:l!'.!.stanee which the Se~urity Council had re .... 
~ommended in the !res olution of June 2'1':. ·. tl'he new r-ssolutioti 
. . ·. . . . I . . 
reeommende~ ntha all Members providing military forces and 
other assistance pursuant t.o the aforesaid Security Council 
resolutions ( Jun 25th and June 27th) . make suoh .for'Ces and 
other $,ssis.t anc e !available to a unified command under the 
United . States." 1It fu.X'the r re commended. that the Uni ted States 
designate the eo meander of such forces., and reque s ted the 
United States to !fu:rnish e.ppr.op;riate re ports cm "the course 
. . 2 
of action taken u der the unified eommand. tt In addition , 
the unifi$d <lomma:~d was authorized to fly the United Nations 
flag , at :tts disc ~etion, together 1th the fla gs of' the other 
. . 
I 
nationa participating in the operations against the North 
1 
Korean force:i ,. 
Sir Glad1f1n Jebb, of the United Kingdom 1 spoke in 
. I 
favor of the resolution and gave a summary . intended to 
. ., ' I . 
clarify its prov+sions-. Prior to its adoption, Jebb _point ed 
to the diff'iculties of complyi with the provisions of 
Article 42 of th4 United Nations Charteri dtffieultie a 
_derived from - the fact that the prior military agreements 
betwe en .the SecuJity Council and ·t.1em.ber . statea, whi ch were 
I . . 
to provide the f rm.er with power to en.force the security 
provisions of th~ Charter .as envisaged in Article 43 had 
not come into fo 1ee. (Specifically , .A.:rt 1cles ~2 to 50 in -
cl u sive are those which outline "action to be taken by air , 
I 
sea; o:r land .for-qes as may be necessary to maintain or 
restoreinternat~one.l pe:aee and security" under the direction 
$:t' a. "Military S ;aft Committee" drawn from the "Chiefs of 
Staff of the po~nent members of the Security Couneil or 
their representativ es.") Jebb stated that since a unified 
com..rnand was esse J tial if confusion were to be avoided, and 
sinoe the Charteit had not ·eome fully into f0ree, the Council 
oould "naturally !act on1y under ~ticle 39 , which enables 
the Security Council to recommend what measures should be I · · · 2 
ta.ken t-o restore international peace and seourity .. " · 
l 
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7 July 1950, · No. 118, PP • 3 ... 5 . Jebb mainto.tned that the 
"necessary reconro+endatlons wer ·e duly made in the re sol ution .s 
of 25 and 27 Jun~, but in the nature of thin gs t hey could 
only be :re com.mendia.tions to individual r,fonibers o:f the. United 
Tb.a J?ran~o- British resolution with respect t-0 th e 
' 
creation of a un 'fied command was adopted by seven votes to 
none, !l'ith three a.bste .ntions , and one member absent (u. s .S.R11 ). 
India joi-ned Egy t . e.nd Yugoslavia in a.bstainin- g . None of 
those ab atainin g offered any co .ment on t he resolution at . the 
tim of its adoption . 
The. repr se ,ntati ves of Nationalist China and of the 
Republic of Ko:Pej both gave sup-porting speec hes to the -resolu-
ion of July 7·. "f'hich established a unified command. The 
delegate of Nati onalist China called attention to the Japanese 
war of aggressio~ on China, wbi ~ had begun on July 7, 1931 
a.nd which the teague of Mati ons had .failed to cha -ck. In 
Nati ons. It cou 1d no , t h er ef ore be the Uni od Uatio ns -o:r ·, the $e .m,1~ity Cou:qcil which themselves epp .ointed a United Nations 
co mmanoe .:r.'' Aecording t o Jebb, the function of the unifi e.d 
command was "not -1s.n operative one"; e..ll it. could do was to 
make sure that the individual efforts of t he Members -concerned 
were properly codrdinated. Jebb based the function of the 
unified command on Article 39 of the Ch~ter . But Article 39 
provi des f or Se-eurity Council supervision over both measur es 
involving t he us~ of arme d force and those not involving the 
use of al'm.ed force .. Those involving the use of ari:ne-d force 
are provided :for 11n Articles 42 to 5-0 inelusive, while thoee net involving th6i use of armed force are provided fo r in 
A.rtiele.s 40 and 4!1~ One of t he main fun.ct .ions of' t hese ~ti cles 
under Chapter VII of the Charter•ia ~o differentiate ol~a:rly 
between measures involving the use of force and t hose :no'b re ... 
quiring 1.t. Under all the Articles from 40 to 50 inclu sive, 
both t h ose inv olvin g the use of foree and those net involving 
the use of for•ce- ... sueh as the severance o f diplomatic relations; 
ete .. --t he Council's resol utions are regarded as decisio ns; and 
as such become mandatory for the parties concerned. The only 
porti on o.r Chapt~zt VII devot~d tor commendations is Artic le 39. 
Reeo mmendat1ona t:tY the Securi ty Council are made under Chapter VI, 
Pacific Set tl ement of Di spu tes, and reeo 1-mne da t ions mentioned 
in Article 39 of Chapter VII would s-aem to liefer to a twilight 
zone between Oha~ter VI and Ghe.pter l/II 1 in which the use of 
the eoercive aspects of t h e latter Chapter -c0uld be avoided if 
that were desired . The le gal as pec ts of Artiele 39 a:re dis• 
cussed in Chapter VII of t h e t hesis. 
pleading for the support · of the resolut .ion before the Council ., 
i 't'>~ 'F,siang remin l ed the delegates of the heavy pr1ee p~i~ by . . 
the Leagu e ·• s failure. and s-tr-e-sse d the- logic o:t the adopti on · · 
of the l"eaoiutioh for · a unifi ed eomm~nd to r~pel the aggre ·ssion 
' . ·l I -
in Korea. The delegate o2 .t-he. RepubliQ of Korea• in a speech 
immediately foll wing the adoption of the ~frnolution;, describ ed. 
with gre a t em.oti n the neroism of the Korean people in what he 
called -the · blood battle against · violent Communist armed 
. . . 
aggression. He compared the attaek of June 25· on his country 
- - r · 2 
with the na.'.!ted '.lggre.ssion on PGland and Pearl. Harbor, 
· The repr l sentati ve -Of the 1Jni tea States (Austin)· 
stated _that the [ nite d ~3trtes would aceept .the .'tr.iig and 
s.peoial n re-sponsibilities- imposed upon her by the resolution . 
:11hf) udastardly o tbreak:tt (1n Korea) had :made an niestte of 
f'I>eedom 01' $laver• out Of what appeai>e~ on the surface to be 
a smaJ.1 matter• , .n4 the Unite .d ~te.tfHl would eontin:iu.e to dis-
or..a.rge he'.ti €1·bl1g tions as a Membe-r or- the United Nati °'ns in 
carrying out the :resolution e-st-al!tliebing a unifi ·~d eomms.nd 
. 3 
under the United ·states . 
1'11.~ u ified Command in . Op~ration 
On July f• 1950, P1>e;i<lent Tl'Umt\n named General 
Doupas M$eArth~ - as the command:er of all United Natio ns 
. . . f ' .. . . 
--55-
military fo cea figlltln.g in defense of the Republic of Korea. 
General 1j!sc rthu. i, • hi'therto commander of the oc cupa tion fo~ces 
in Japan 1 • t' u~ e x eud$d his command to lne1ude Korea, _ under 
~ . . l 
the July rec; mmendation of the Security Council . On 
July 1.5~· 19 , o,- Pr~sident Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea 
I 
pl ced all he Republie of Korea: 1·s armed forces unde r the 
Supreme Oo 1ander! of the United Nations Forces, an d on 
O (Korean date)> hhe Genert;;l Headquart ers of the 
United Nati ns Go and was establis hed ~n fokyo, At .the nex~ 
meeting of the Sepu:rity Council af·ce:r> the adopti <im. of the 
July 7 Resoluti~n , the first :!'eport of the Unified Command 
was submitted to lthe Council by the United States Governmant. 
The report stated t ha t at "0400 Korean time on Sunday, 
25 June · 1950, the Nort h Korean Arm:y la unehed a completely 
unpl"ovoked invasion of ·Sout ... Korea . tt After a description of 
·t;he attac ks launched., t • e z•eport stated that fro m the size 
and character of' he ~ttaclts it was indicat ed "clearl y that 
-2 
the invasion had reen earefu _lly- pl.a.nned long in a v nee." 
The Return of ·the U .s .s .R. to the 
.s'eeu:ri~z .·GQUnGil 1; ~:ngust +• 1950 
On August 1, . 1950 , t b e represent ative of the u.s.s.a. 
returned to the Security Council to :Preside QS its Presid ent 
du.ring the month of· August . Jacob ,•allk . (u .s .s.R. ) o:pene -d 
the meeting with a. pr esi dential ruling to e.xclud.e the repre-
l 
New Yor~ Time~J July 9, 1950 1 P • 1~ eol . 5. 2· 
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I· 
sentative of the l"Kuomintang group" from the Council , His 
ruling was immediately challenged by Austin of the United 
Stat es,. and the j ouncil became involved in a heated debate 
over the issue of the Chin ese rep~esentative on the Council . 
I 
India and: Yo-gos1\via supported the Presidentts rulin g , but 
it was ove,r.ridden by the other ei ght members of the Council. 
'J.'he President t b.Jn engaged in a controversy with the American 
representative over the countin g of the vote during .m.ich the 
President finall J agreed to include the vote of the "Kuomintang 
1 
group" in the eo1nt. 
Mr. Ma.li then endeavore d to hatre the Council adopt 
a provisional agenda which eontained th €se items: "Recognition 
of the Peonle's Government of the People's Republic of China ~ I , 
as the represent.at1ve of China, " and "Peaceful settlement of 
t he Korean que.st~on . " After sev ral me-etings, during Whieh 
long speeches were read by the representative of the u.s.s .R. 
citing the deeds lot destruction bein g perpetrated in Korea 
by , Le ruling cilroles of the United States,tt a vote was 
. I 
finally ta.ken on the provisional agenda . The item concerning 
the re cognition if the representative of the Peopl e 1s Republic 
of China was reje cted with five in favor, five against, and 
one abstention; nd th.at coneerni1ag the . peaceful settlement 
of the Kor ea .n problem ws.s rejected with only three votes in 
. I 
:favor. - A third ~tem, "Complaint of aggression upon the 
Republic of :Kore, ,l' submitted by the Uni ted Sta t es, was 
1 
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adopted; 
"'"57• 
and tbe Council loved on to discuss this item at its next 
meeting . The U. , .s .. R. delegate reiterated -his charge that 
.. 
any disc u ssion w thout the participation 0£ a repreaentative 
1 
of the . Pe ople• s epub lie of China wa$ ille gal . 
M11iltary Activities in l(o,e, ,n 
Ret~eat _and Counter Offensive 
I 
The SeoUl.'ity Council then engaged 1n 'heated de-bate 
over the le gali tYil of the various resolution .a adopted on the 
Korean problem ., These resolutions concerned the question of 
the reco gnition of the representative of the People's Republic 
. I . . 
of Chi na, the . pa tie1pa.t1on of ttepr ,eaentatitr$S of Nox-»t h Korea 
in the Council discussions, the "complaint of bombings by 
2 
'Qnited States air plane -s .of the . territory of Chine," and the 
3 
"compl ai nt Q:f th _ armed invasion of 'fa.iwan (.Formosa)." 
Meanwhile, mi.lite.-ry activities in Korea hAd ta ken a 
sudden turn . ~rng the 111ontha of July and August the foroes 
aiding the South jKorean~ had been driven into retreat . As 
they began to recover, active preparations w~re made for a 
counter offensive !. A spectaculat• landing of 50_,000 Marines 
and infantry at Inchon, near Seoul,, on Se:pte-mber 15, 1950 , 
marked the b$ginnjtng -.of the counter ofi"ansive . The No:rtb 
Korean Ar my llad w;orn it s el f out 1.n indecisive attacks, and by 
. _ _ \J,N. s .c.l Off-Jt Rf;lc. 1 Sth Yr. , 482nd Meeting, 
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I 
a rapid ~eries o~ movesr General ~ac thur's foroes turned the 
North Koreen resistance into a rout . The result as surprising. 
By October l., 1950 1 the United Nations were raced with a de• 
cision -as to whe her their forces Should cross t.he thirty-
1 
ei gh th parallel 1nto · North Korea ·. 
Accordi~ -ly, a resolut1<m v,as introducea in the 
General Assem'bly 11s Political .and Security Committee (First 
I Committee) which asked for a recommendation that tta.11 appro -
·pr1a.te, steps b - a n to ensure co~d1t1ons of stab111 ty through 
the whole -of Kor a» and "that all constituent acts be taken 
including the ho ding of elections under the aus p ices of the 
United Nations, or the establishment of a unified, independent 
2 
and d-em,ocratie government in the sovereign state o:f Korea . '' 
General Ma eArt hJ, in an open statement ''to the Comm-e.nder•d .. n-
Ohief of the Jor h Korean forces,it called on the North Ko:Peans 
"to lay -down youl ar-m.s and cease hostilities" and to accept 
" ueh military supervisio -n as I may direct . " No mention was 
made of the polit,ioal issues involved or the thifty-ei ghth 
3 I · , 
parallel . _-
on Oetob~r 4 -,- the Political and Security Committee 
I 
cast a 47 to 5 vote 1.n .favor of an eight powe:t> r-esolut1on 
- I 
giving indirect uthorizat1on to General MacA?-thur to cross 
the thirty-eig ~t f parallel . The resolu.t1on was scheduled to 
go before the Assembly itself on Ootobe :r 6 , with a clear 
]. 
New Yorlt Tim,es, October 1, 1960, Sec. 4, p . l. 
:Ibid. I 
Ibid . 1 P • 1,. col. 8 . 
... 59. 
indication that jt woul d be adopted~ The P litieal and 
Sec ur 'ity Oomm.i ttae re jeeted by a 46 to 5 vo · e -tb.e Sovi et- • 
bac.k.ed r~solut:to callin g fori a cease• f ire - in Korea., immediate 
i . . . J . ' . . 
Wit h drawal, of f oj ei gn United ~e.tions ti'"oopsJ)_ and then eleetions 
to be· ot-gani~ed IY North and South Koreans~ _ , 
On Ootoba 7, Tokyo -announced that South Korean troops' , 
had crossed the i rty-ei ghth parallel in force the day betM"'ff 
. 2 
{Oetober 8th Kor an ti me). In New Yot-k, the Genel"al Ass embly, 
. . ' 
on · Octobe .r 7 ·~ . voted 47 t-o 5 with B abstentions to adopt the 
resolution for ~ l.f:testi on of K<>res by "all appropl'tate steps,• 
t hus giving its 1bu 1raet support to the military advances 
aeros~ .the t h 1rt f e tgh th P!ll'allel, ·
3 
Tok yo ann ouneed that 
American gro:&
0
:
0
. f' orow::. had crossed t h e parallel f or t he f1:tW$t 
ti me· in the a ~v ~. at 5il4 P. M. , October ·?~ Korean time 
(3t14 A .• M., oeto (:r 7th, Eastern 
4 
Standard Time) , in o:rder t0 
r-econnciter the e,nemy pos1 t ions . Wnus, some .American t roop s 
h ad crossed the t , . :lrt y ... eight.h parallel a fet.-v hours be:f"or~ the 
I ~t , -- -Gene·r~l Assembly f , · t L s final approval on the reso1ution. for-
the unirteation f KQrea by "all appropriate steps." On 
- . 
N~w Yor J Time,s, October 5, . 1950, p . 1 , _e-0-J.. , e. This 
is the resolu.tionl whic h wa s adop ted on Oetobe?" 7; , Its per .. 
forms.nee neeesst~~ted the use of United Nation s forces north 
o:f the t h 1rtry~ei sn th parallel.• 
:2 
I'bi<i .. ,_ ctober 6, 1950 1 P• 1 1 col . 8 .• $ .. 
;):,bit.• qetober 8 , 1950 , P• 1, eol . 6. See also 
U.N. a-. A., ()ff .. Reo., 5t h Sess ., Supplement 20, · Resolutions 
adopted b]f th~ Geineral Assembly durtn g the period 19 Septembel' 
to 1 6 n e:e_ mber 17so, _ PP• 9-10~ 
Ibid.,, P, .. l• col . a. -
October 9,. l050 ( okyo date), General MaeArthur, in an ul -
timatum addressed to nthe Premier and Government of North 
Korea, called o the Nort h Koreans 6 for the last timett to 
lay down their ars and eea.se hostilities . . He warned the 
orth Korean governm~nt t hat unless 1t answered i mmediately 
I he would have to proceed at once to "take such military action 
I· 
as may be necess~:ry . _ff The messa ge was broadcast fro m Seoul 
and with it the text of the United Nations resolution recently 
1 
passed by the Gen,eral Assembly .. No answer appeared to be 
forthcoming, $and the war ra~~d on . 
The Int~rvention of the Peo~let$ Republic 
I of Ohina 
General l~ac Arthur' s. forces presse d northward~ and as 
I 
they neared the Yalu River separating North Koren from 
anchuria they met stiff .ened resistance. Nevert heless , 1t 
. appeared, at th~ beginning o:f November, that t he mil1 tary 
phase of the Koreen war would so on be ove,-r. Suddenly Chines& 
Communists pour~d across the Yalu River and brou ght advances 
2 
to a standstill ,. On 'Nove i:nber 3:, · . Hong Kong reported that 
l 
New York Times . October 9 , 1950, p . 1, col . a. 
2 I 
'fh e Chinese Com~un iat ·build-up i n :tfort h Korea pro .. 
bably started rlbout Oct ober 16 . , In a special r port sub• 
m1tted to the Secur.ity Council on · 6 November 1950, General 
MacArthur .mentioned the movement of Chinese Communist troops 
across the Yalu River on October 16 ' a:nd October - · 20~. These 
troops proceeded into North Korea to take position near the 
Ch osen, · Fusen, and Sui- Ho Dams. (V . N •. s.c • Off . Rec . 5th Yr . , 
518th Meeting, 6 Neve mber 1950. No . 60, PP• 4 .. 5). 
I 
I 
I 
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an all - out · propaganda c.a..~ai gn was being waged in Chi na in 
. I 
order to gain _pub~ic support . for a more active pa 1"ticipation 
by Chinese Communists in t he Korean war . Premier Chou En•lai 
r 
( People 1 s Republ1 1c of China) had declared in a speech on 
Sep te mber 30 · t ~e:t the Pe1pl,.ng regime would not n~mpinely 
toleratett a cros in.g of the t hi rty - ei ghth parallel by the 
United Nations tJrces . The propaganda c~mpaign was la~gely 
dormant, however until the United Nations forces began to 
l 
near the Manchurian border . 
I On No.vem~er ~ ( Tokyo date), General MacArthur issued 
a. United Nations / communique on "intervention• in the Kore .an 
I -
war . In the conmrunique he .stated that the Korean war had 
been brou gh t to. a. practical end until the ·Chinese eommun1sta 
had moved large nu:rnbera of forces across t he Yalu River 
- 2 . 
1nto North Kore . Hong Kong re ported on WovembeP ·5 , that 
I 
all the parties 1partie1pat1ng in the Communist - dominated 
Peiping coaliti n government h.ad issued a formal deela.ra.tion 
gi vin g full aup ort to those Ohinese who "voluntarily und er-
take the sacred / taslt of resist ing America,. aiding Korea, prQ .. 
tectin g their homes and defending their , eouRtry .. " The state -
ment maintained. that "positive action" we.a necessitated by 
the United Mations move a.cross the th1rty ... e1ghth parallel 
I 
and the advanc~s of lar ge forces toward th e Yalu ·River 
l 
New York Tim~s, November 4~ 1950, P• 3 , col . 2 . 2 . . 
Ibid . J November 6. 1950 , P• 5, col . 1 . 
I 
r 
I 
boundary betwe e n , __ orea e.nd i:anc huri • The eip1 declaration 
maintained that the 
United S ·ates imperialists are .copyin g t he old 
tirick of the , Japanese bandits -- f-rat . invading Korea 
and then in ~ding China. Everyone kno s Korea is a 
small country, but that its stJ:>a.tegie position is 
very :tmpor·tant. Just as with the Japanese imperialists 
in the past, l the main objective of United States 
I 
aggression on Korea is not Korea itself, but Ch ina. 
isto .ry show that the existence of the Korean Peo,ple' s 
Republic s.nd its fall, and the_security ·of or dan ger to 
China are closely intertwined . ~ 
Maintai~ t ng that United Ne.tion s forees htld i gnored 
.Peiping's ttwarni ;ngff by crossing the thirty-eighth parallel 
and pushing tow rd China, the statom ent insisted that 
Oom.~uniat China wanted peace and added: 
We hold ' that; the Korean question should be solved 
in a pe~cef1rtl way and that the aggressive forees 2o-f the imperialist .s should be withdrawn rx-om Korea , 
The Kor an problem had entered a new phase . The 
intervention of the People•e Republic of' China dampened the 
-ardor of those ho hnd visualized Unite-d Nations supremacy 
thro hout all 'Korea and the firm precedent that would have 
been esta blishd,d by the action of an international authority 
capable of halting the unsanctioned use of armed force . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l 
Iiew Xo,1:k Ti :es, Novembe1~ 6 1 1950, p . 1, co l . 7. 
2 
Ibid~ 
-
I 
I 
I 
I 
CHAPTER VI 
THE A.MERI AN VIEW OPPOSED: THE POSITIONS OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLI C OF CHINA 
AND THE u .s.s.R. 
The In~itation to the People's Republi c 
of China to Meet with the 
Secur1tlCouno11 
I The intervention of the Chin ese Commun ists chan ged 
the nature of tlile war in Korea . The event we.a of such pro -
found si gnificance that the Security Council proceeded 
i mmediately to f onsider t he extension of an invitation to 
the People's Republie of China. to send a r ep resentative to 
► 
the Counci l in prder to state that countr y 's vi ews. When 
the Council met _on Nove mber 8 , 1950, to c onsider the question., 
the United States re_presenta.tive was outspoken in his 
op position to suc h an invite.tion .1t 
Warren _/Austin rejected the proposition that an invita-
tion should be extended to the Communist re gi me alt hough t his 
procedure would have been 1n -accordance with the practi~e 
I 
generally follpwed by the Security Council of hearing all 
pa'!"ties to a dttspute in order to avoid resolving cont ro-l . 
versies by vio
1
len ea~ Instead, he maintained that witnesses 
f or t hat regi me should be summoned before t he Counci l t o g1ve 
what e.xplanat i!ons they could of the state of affairs wh ich 
I 
l 
h ad been :~reated -. 1 
The dele ;g te of the u.s. s.R. took exce ption t-0 Aust in's 
! 
re marks, mai nt ainin g that such _wo•rd.s as "eummontt or "eall upon" 
we:i'e out of place in connection with an invitation to be ex. 
tended to a sove:r :eign state .. l~al ik further asserted t h at the 
I 
spokesman in question would re present the government of a 
country of 47-5 ·m·11 1on inhabitan ts, a fact which ga ve particular 
point to the principle that relations between soverei gn states 
I 2 
should not be conducted in terms of orders or dictations . 
After so l_e f'urther diseussion, a resolution propqsed 
by the United Kingdom was adopted by 8 votes to 2, with one 
I 
- I 
abstention . Communist China was to send to the Council a 
representative w o would be permitted to partic i pate in the 
I 
I -discussion of the special report of the Uni ted Nations Command 
$ . ! 
in Korea . ~h e United States voted for the resolution . 
I 
The Oo ination of the- Two ~e~tions: 
"com la.int of A'.rmed, In vasion of f aiwan Formosa) " and 
· "ComRlaint of J\ge;res s ion upon the Repu b lic of _ Kore _a 11 
When th Council et on November 8.'7, th e Pr esident of 
the Council had /placed on th-e provisional agenda a twofold 
I questiont 11(a) <Uompla1nt of armed invasion of Taiwan (.Formosa)" 
and tt{b } Complaint of' a gression upon the Republic of "'orea . " 
1 · 
U. N • .S .. p. Off , Rec., 5th Yr., 520t h Meeting, 
8 November 1950~ No. 62, PP• l•2 • 
2 
Ibid•, PP • 2-4 . 3- ·1 
Ibid., pp . 8-9 . The special report was read to the 
Oouneil at t he 518t h Meeting on November 6, 1950, pp . 3-5 . 
I The delegate of the u.s.s .. R .. ·mmediately objected to the 
combination~ sta~1ng that the representative of th People•e 
Republic of China was not m owered to ape k on the s eond 
I item , since his ~overmnent did not recognize the Unified · 
Command. Malik nt on to explain that the delegate from 
Oommun1st China a in Net York not to ,nswe~ the novamber 8 
invitation or t~e Council, but 1n response to n ai-11er 
l 
invitation ex enf1ed 1n September . The e rlie~ invitation 
had be n lseued ~n connection · 1th a discussion eonoerning 
2 
the "eomplaint of the armed invasion or Taiwan.' ith the 
earlier invitation in mind, this particular meeting ha . bean 
I 
oalled at the request of tho u.s .s .R. to d1seuss subject (a} . 
The Chiqese Communist delegate had been sent by his 
government to cJ>8,rge the United States 1th invasion of 
Taiw n (Formos , and aggression in Korea, , nd. to participate , 
if possible, in 1 .gener 1 discussions of the whol Koziean problem . 
I 
u.w.s.c. Ree., 5th Yr ., 525th Meeting , 27 November 
1950., S/PV 5251 PP• !•10 . The rGference denoted (S/PV 525) 
indie tes that , he source material is derived r :rom m1rneogrephed 
record of the Se¢ur1ty Council forwarded to the University of 
Rhode Island library by the United Nations . These mimeographEld 
records serve in lieu of the finished Official R cords, which 
have not as ye1' been sent to this library, but r not to be 
considered oi'fiie.ial a th y have not yet been fully correct d. 
2 
U. N.S.iO. Qft,, Rec., 5th Yr.~ 506th Meeting , 
29 Septem'Ser 1950, No-• 48 ., PP• 3.,.5. On 29 September 1950., the 
Council ~dopted a .resolution p:roposed by Ecuador which invited 
a represent&tive Qf the People's Republic of China "to attend 
the meetings o.f the Security Council held nf'ter 15 November 
1950 dur1n~ the disouss1on of that Government's declaration 
regarding an armed invasion of the Island of Ta1van (Formosa)." 
There were 7 votes in favor, 3 age.1nst,and one abstention . 
'l'he United 'tapes voted gainst the resolution . 
After muoh lleate debate. this procedure was finally agreed 
to by the soviet lum,on., ~nd 1t ~ras decided to let the delegate 
I ,. . r th~ People's ,epubl1c of China state his governments view 
under the combin heading originally p:roposed by the President 
1 
of the Oouncil. Since then the Security Council hss con• 
sidered the two problems as aspects of a single problem . 
~l';\e fos _i ti n or the PeQple• s R~pub11e of . Chill$ 
l . . . . 
On Novem er 28 ► 1950; 7u Hsiu -,.Chuan present.ed the 
. ' 2 
views of the Peoiple's Republic' of Chi~ to the Security Council. I ·-
Ftret, . he pJ>oteslted against the continued seati ng of the rep;-e -
sentat1ve ~f the / "Ohinesa Kuomintang _reactionary remnant _ cl1 :~ue . " 
Wu oalled atten't)ion to the fact that Premier Mao Tse-tung of 
the Central Peo11e 111 Government of the People t i, Re.public ot 
China had solemnly proclaimed to the whole world on October 1 1. 
1949 1 that, t~j-government was the sole legal government to 
represent all t e people of Obina . Since November 151 l949t I -
he said, his go ernmen ·t had been ende voring to have the 
Chinese Kuom1nt ng delegates expelled , but these efforts bad 
been obst:i,uoted bY' the tJn1ted States .in spite of! the at:r1rma-
. 3 
tive votes of s :tteen member states o:f the United ·Nations- . 
_ UitN. $ . (:. R~~., 5th Yr ., 525th Meeting, 27 November 
1950~ S/PV 526:, IP• 71. · · 2 ' 
U.N.s . g. or:r . Rec;, 527th Meeting, 28 November 1950, 
No .• 69:, PP• :( ... 9 • 
· 3 l AP I!! 1 u .. N.G.~. VJ.r. Ree ., uth Se ssion, p enary Meetings , 
Verbatim ffecordb o"f Meetings ·; Vol. I, 19 September-
15 December 195P, p . 15. On September 19, 1950, India su.bmittec:l 
Wu maintai ned t ha:t t h e people of Chin a had no reason to 
re cognize any resolutions or deci&ions of the United Nations 
I 
wit h out the part i 1eipation of the lawful representative of the 
I 
Peo ple's Republic of Ch ina , - and onc-e r.aore called fol;' the 
expulsio n of t he 1<u omi ntan ,rou p . · 
Wu char g~d President Truman with having insti ga te d 
t he 0 pup pet Government of Syngman Rhee in Sout h Korea" t o 
start the civil vts.r in Koree . He t p.en asserted that resident 
I 
Truman had stated on June 27 t hat the "Unite d States Govern -
, 
ment had decided to prev ent by f orce t he lib eration of Taiwan 
by the Cent ,rsl People 1 s Government of the Peo ple's Republic 
or Ch i na . '' 'l'o t is end the United States h ad begun her 
full.scale op en t nvasio n ef Taiwan . Taiwan, Wu continued , · 
was an in separabie paZ't ot t he territory of Chi na . He invoked 
1 
a Uni ted States mite Paper t o snow tha t t he "native popula -
tion for fifty years had been under the rul e of a. foreign 
i nvadet- " and t hat durin g t he occnpe.tion " the pt-inc:pal hope 
of the peo ple had been reu nio n with the tn$1nland . " Wu chn_rged 
the United State wit h hav i ng also violated China's territorial 
waters and territorial air alon g and within it_s coastlin e, b y 
conducting a ctiv e reoonnaisance and patrols . He ealled 
attention to a 8itatement of President Truman on January 6, 1950, 
in whie h he had de clare d t h at " the United otates and the other 
a resolution wh~-Oh \Youl d have gra nte d Uni te d Nations re cog~ 
nition to the People's epu.blic or Ch ina . The res ol u tion was 
~e jected by 33 votes t o 16, with 10 abste ntions . 
l 
u.s~ D,part.ment of State, United States Relations 
with China, Publication 3573, p . 308 . 
Allied P~~era have accepted the exercise ot Chinese authority 
over the island," and to resident Roosevelt s declar tion 
at Cairo on Dec~~ber l, 1943.; that Formosa · should be restored 
to the Republic of China . Putting both of these cl ims to-
I getb.er with the revisions of Article 107 of the Charter , 
·tu contended that the United lretions had no right to alter 
1 
the statu.-s of Taiwan •. · 
~u ,1ent rn to cba~ ge_ the United States With having 
follmved a policy of open intervention in China 1 s internal 
s.ffai:rs from 1946 to the present . Ee maintained that 1:'imerican 
aid to nthe Cbia.ng Kai--shek Kuomintang reactionary clique" 
I bad made it possible £or Chiangts government to launch a civil 
war against the peo le whieh was unprecedented in China's 
history for its scale and cruelty . He stated that .Ameriean -
tro ops stationed in China had participated directly in the 
I 
ct vi 1 we.r nd that the United States and Chiang's governmen t 
hed signed "all kinds of unequal treaties and agreement.a 
whiah reduced China to the status of a colony and military 
I 
b se of the Uni 1,;ed Ste:tes . u On the basis of these tree ti.es 
and agreements, ! u charged, 'the United States Government 
secured many naval and air bases in Kuomi~tang China and 
gained control bf the military, political 6 financial , and 
2 
economic branches or the Kuomintang Government . " 
U11N.s.,e ... Of'f . Rec ., 6th Yr . , 527th Meeting , 
28 November l9SO, No, 69, PP• 1~16 . 
2 
Ibid , , pp. 15• 18. 
I 
l 
Wu char ge the United States dth explotting Tai :qan, 
. I 
economically and adverted to alleged naval and military 
sctivities of the /United States an Chiang Kai-shek, He 
then asserted that "the United Stat es Government continues, 
t hr ough the Kuomintang remnant cl que~ to tey to prevent the 
People's Republie
1 
o.f China .f'ro liberating Taiwan, so that 
Taiwan may re aid u..t1der the actual do::ninat1on . of the Uni ted 
l 
St tes,.tt 
The .A:mer~can intervention _n Taiw n·, con tinue d \Vu ,-
se:r>;vgd to pro ve o tho Chinese people the .t tb.e United States 
viewed ith host lity the vi cto ries of the Chlnese people . 
He stated that the 1nte1:•venti n in Taiwan was , no·h an isolated 
affair but Qil in e ·r.al par·l; of an over-all plan to enslav e 
the peoples of Asia . e ma.int ined t hat General MacArt hur 
had revived Japa ese fascil3m and was u.s.in g Ja.pe.n .as the h ead .... 
I 
quarters for aggr ssion ,in As1 • . Indeed, the Korean war as 
approaching so dlose to C in that China was enly se par ated 
from t he con.fla g~ tion by a narrow river. so th t her security 
was gravely thr~ate ned . , u could not se e , on the other hand, 
how the secur i ty of the United Statee was jeopardized by the 
I 
a..r in Korea when the United States was about 5,000 miles 
2 
distant . 
U.M. 8.b,., Off . Rec., 5th Y:r •• 527th Meeting, 
28 No\tember 1950 1 No . 69 , pp , 18-20 . 
2 
ill.!•, 1 pp. 20- 21 . 
I 
I 
I 
He asked the United Nations Security Council to 
condemn the United States for her actions and to take steps 
I 
t,o stop Amer"ican rrarmed aggression a ainst the territory of 
Ch ina , 'Taiwan , an<il armed intervention in Korea.. _i, Secondly, 
he requested the t ouncil to erfact the complete withdrawal of 
United States forces from Taiwan, •11n order that peace and 
I 
security n the P oifie and in Asia may be ensured . " 
Th irdl-1, Wu askeq that the Council adopt ra.ea:3ures to bring 
about ttthe with awal from Korea of the ar med forces of the 
I United Sta :bes and all other countries, and to leav it to the 
peo ple or Nox-th nd Sout h Korea to settle the domestic affairs 
or Korea themselvEts, so that a pea.ceful solution of the 
l 
Korean question may be achieved.._,, 
I 
'l'he Position of t .he . u .s .s.R. 
on NovembeT 29, the representative of the Sov1 .et 
Uni on gave a sutnntary of the position of his government . 
Malik stated that since August 5, the u.s.s.R. delegation 
I 
had p~oduced dopuments and data to show that the events 
I 
ta king place in Korea had begun on June 25 as a t-esult of a 
I 
provocative at 1ack by the out h Korean authorities on frontier 
areas of the K~rean Democratic People's Republic . He furthe r 
ma intained tha the attaek had been carried cut in accordanoe 
with a ffpreviously tho ht out and prepa~ed plan under the 
d1reetion and J.Tith the dire ct partieipa.tion of United &tates 
1 
u.:n.s .c. Off . Reo ., 5th Yr ., 527th Meeting, 
28 November 1950., No. 69, P• 25. 
I 
I 
I 
military advisers,
1 
as well as with the knowledge of highly 
1 
placed off"cials oP the United States •• ·u . .. 
The u.s.s.
1
R. had pursued a policy of peaee, ·its 
delegate stated , na., as eal."ly as Aug,J.at ha.d submitted a 
resolution asking the Council to "consider it: necessary to 
invite representatives of the People 1 s Republic of China and 
also re resent t1,es of the ... rean people to attend th e dis • 
eussions of the ~orean question in the Counci l . " This reaolu -
_tion, moreover, a. c n ained a propos l to "put a,n end to the 
I 
hostilities in K re a and at the same time to withdraw foreign 
troops from. Korea . " .,1a.lik contended that furthe:t' propoaals 
. I 
b.ed been advancea in October by the delegation of the .s .s.R. , 
' ich l'OUld have guaranteed a deois1on on the que .stion of the 
I 
ndependenc o.f Korea and a peaceful settle ent All these 
pr~:rposa.ls ., . Lal 1 said, . rn-r,e r jected by tne 1ln l ted States 
delegation and dele ga.ti.ons of ot er countries whic h fre -
quently supported the United States . Callin g attention to 
the Moscow Conf rence of Foreign Minist rs in December, 1945 1 
he held that a dectsion had been arrived at in that meeting 
wh--teh would b.a~e fully guaranteed the rehabilitation of Korea 
as an independent and damo0ratic state . This decisi-on, . Malil< 
I 
states, had been sabotaged bJ the United States government 
2 
and the American co mad in South Korea . 
1950 , 
1 
U. N .. SC . Rao . g s/PV 528, 
P • 9.1. 
2 
Ibid . , PP• 92-94 . 
-
t 
I 
I 
I 
628th Me~ting, 29 November 
M lik charged the United States 1th having violated 
the Mosco. agreeme t and tn_ldng the Korean question into the 
United Nations in ' iolatton of Article 107 of the United Nations 
1 
Chartel' . ,Ie e.:rgu-ed also that the Commis sion 1 s report to the 
I 
United . ations eoneerning the outbreak of hostilitie s was un .. 
reliable and biased, pa~ticularly since it had been sign ed by 
"a represents.ti ve pf 'the Kuomintang called Chu- Tu . " [alik 
then reiterated t e position of the U .s.s .. R.. that the Se curi t y 
Council's reaolut3Jons of June 25 and June 27 :wer e illegal 
. ( . . 
because they were made ·without the participation of two per. 
. 2 
manent members of' the Council--the U .S ·aB.R ., end China . 
The Rusairn dele gate ch rged the American gov~rnment 
with havln violated international agreements b"Y having 
I 
erossed the thirty-eighth parallel with military forces and 
advanced on the bontier of China . He claimed that the 
United State .a be ore tne Communist . victory had converted China 
I • ·' . 
into a colony by means of' enslaving agreements, and had 
allocated over 5 billj.on dollars in the four post ar years 
I 
1945 - 49 to aid Chiang Ka:t- shak to crush the liberation 
movement or the /chinese p ople . American policy, he said , 
I 
Article 107 states, "Nothing in the :present Charter 
shall invalidat or preclude action in relation to any state 
which during the second World War h s been an enemy of any 
I 
signatory to _the present Charter ·, taken or authorized as a 
result of that ar by the go·ve:rnm.enta having responsibility 
for sueh aotion ,. ~ Ko:re_a., of eourse. had been part 0f Japan 
. during the war • 
. 2 
u . N.s . c . Ree . , S/PV 528 ., 528th Meeting , 29 November 
1950 • PP• 95 .. §1)'. 
I 
I 
was hostile to the Chinese people, and the seizure of Taiwan 
was a d<,monstratipn ·of t h is h ostility. Malik ma.1.ntedned that 
President Truman•~ order of June · 21 , . by which T iwan had 
been seized, eons rti tute d an ct of o-gression. The seizut-e, 
I 
moreover, w sin ·violation of President Truman's own st,a.tement 
I 
of Janua1•y 5, 1950, th~t t e United _ Ste:tes would not intervene 
in Form.ofHh !,~al · .cont nded t .hat t h e a r med seizure of Taiwan 
could not be tt nited Nations aotion,n since President Truman's 
order had been given pr i or to any decisi on by t he Security 
I 
Council . Tndeed, the Security Council had not come to any 
decision on t he seizure eit her 'before or .after t h e order had 
been given . Malik eontended t hat the:re waa no justification 
in tree.ti the issue of Formosa as on e which wa inti mately 
I 
bound up with the seeurit-y of the Paeif":te . he problem of 
I Formosa, he contended, w an internal affair of China , and 
the United Nati Jns Charter s pecifical l y barred interference 
l 
wl. th the intern l _ affairs of -states• 
Finally. , Mal i k state d t h at the government of the 
I 
People's Republic of China had requested the u.s .s.R. to take 
ur gent steps 
territory of 
I 
to 1 require the 
cJ 1na and Korea. 
it h dra 1 . of troops from the 
Accordin gl y , he ur ged measures 
2 
to br l ng_a'bout such a withdra al . 
1 
U. N. s ~o. Rec . , s/PV 528 , 528th Neeting, 29 November 
1950, pp . "99.107. 
2 
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OHAfTER VII 
LEGALIASPEOTS OF THE KOREAN AOTION 
Pre ~C1"1s1s InternatiQnal Agreements 
Ce>.ncerning Korea · 
The Korfan problem has 'brought to the surfa~e a 
conflict of national interests in the Pacific area . Changes 
as a result of the Second Vlorld War were for seen by the 
participants, and, with the aim of accommodating to these 
changes , a numb~r of agreements ere eontraeted while the 
l 
war was. $till bf1ng waged . In these agreements ., or treaties- -
th Cairo Declaration of i943, the Potsdam Froclamation of 
i945, and the Mhscow Agreement of 1945-- lies much of the 
videnc of . the legal status of Korea ithin the community 
of states prior i to June, 1950. 
l . I 
Herb rit W. Briggs, 'fhe L~w of Nations (2d ed . ; 
N w York, 19.$2)
1
• On page 838, Briggs cites . the Harvard 
Research to the ! effect that a treaty may be defined as: "a 
formal instrument of agr ement by whieh two or more states 
establish or se~k to establish a relation under inter• 
national law b tween themselves . " And on page 839, Briggs 
concluded that jthe narrow use of the te .rm •treaty• in 
American practice contains no implication that most of the 
large number ot xecutive agreements concluded on behalf of 
the United Stat~s ao not have the jur1d1eal force and ef'fect 
of treaties 1n international la • " ( Since both the 1938 and 
1952 editions , olf Briggs• work have been used 1n this thesis, 
re£ -erenees to the 2d edition will hereafter be denoted: 
Briggs., 19.S~; reference to the first edition will continue 
to be denoted: ;Briggs, 19.38. 
I 
Thl Formation of Two States: I ~ . 
N()rth Korea and South Korea 
The Mos,ow Agreement was contracted in order to pro• 
vide a means by \which the independence of Korea could be 
achieved . When \ the United States became dissatiefied w1 th 
the deadlock preduced in the Joint Commission and asked for 
a new four power meeting to be held, its proposal was 
rejected by the \Soviet Union . As a result, the United States 
took the questi l n of Korean independence before the Gencu~al 
Assembly of the \unite d Nations . What was the standing ·of the 
Moscow Agreemenl of 194$? Had it become legally defunct 
following the refusal of the United States to eontinue 
working with th Soviet Union under that agreement? A.ceording 
to customary in ·ernational law , the American interpretation 
of the Moscow Agreement was only on& inte .rpretat1on and did 
l 
not bind the Soviet Union or other parties to the agreement. 
. I . . . . -
Was the Mosc·ow Agreement voided by the submission ot 
the question or 1xorean independence to the · United Nations? 
The genere.l pra qtice of international law argues against 
such a result . !This practice has long indicated ''that when 
1 . 
ariggs, 1938, T~e David J . Adams Case, 1921; p . 44-l. 
Si nce the "fund&l11ental principle of the juridical equality of 
States i s oppos~d. to .placing one State under the jurisdiction 
of anot her Stat8i~, it "1s opposed to the subjeetion ot one 
State to an interpretation of a treaty asserted by another 
State." On page 1 446, in t he Editor ' s Note, Briggs states: 
"Treaties may be interpreted authoritatively only by the 
parties, either directly through mutual agreement or in• 
directly by subnµssion of the dispute to conclliatlen or 
arbitration by s:ome international agency or court mutually 
agreed upon and whose recommendation or decision they agree 
to accept. 0 
a .st te h s bound itself by 
I. 
treaty with another State, it 
cannot the:reat'ter relieve itself of the obligation s it ha s 
l. ; 
assume~ by concluding a later treaty with another rthi~d l 
. ... . I . . ..... ,., 
State under whi i h it assumes obligations the _performance _or 
which would inv 11v~ impair~ent or repudiation of the obliga• 
t1ons pre _vioual t as _sumed . " In the Moscow Agreement _ ~our 
States had unde~taken to provide tor the setting up of a 
. . . .. I , . 
"four pow :r trusteeship of Kore for a period ot up to r1v, 
. l . " 
ye . Ps," and up.ilateral decisions to alter that agreement 
.. . . , . . I . 
could not be birtding on other parties to the agreement . 
, I . . . . . . . . . . 
. · Oould tie establi~hment .of a United ~a~ions .~~m-
m1ss1on on Korea · set side the Moscow Agreement an d provide , 
a 'new modi, ot c+ ating a National Government ~t' Korea ~dai!>' : 
.. thtb direction oil the General Assemblyff lt is difficult tcf 
sea wh~.~~ the uJ 1ted Nations could find the authority und~;-
1 ts Charter · to J,nounc . the ·Moscow Agreement , or to alter . · : ... · · 
the agreem nt td· the extent that it coul d assert t he 
. . , . ; ; I 
authorit -y to conduct elections t~oughout Korea over the 
I 
objeetions of. oJ e 
1
of the parties .. t~ the agr~ement . U~d~r ' . 
what Articles oti\ the Charter could this author! ty be as ser~e -dJ 
If it were looked tor under those concerning ·Trusteeships; ·,: 
. I • ., 
Article 79 v,ould; prevent alteration ef . terms ot the t:ruat♦et 
ship w~thout t;he 1 consent ef the U. S. $ .·R .• ~ Sine a search ot 
. I . ~ 
l 
. 5r1g$S, 1938, Edito~'s Note., Citation of Harvard 
Resear ch, P • 4681. 
2 
Al"tiele l· 79 of the Qharte:r states; nth term s ot 
trusteeship f'or each territory to be placed under the 
t ?'u s t eeahip syst~m, including any alteration or amendment,..; 
shall be a.gree d rpon by the states directly concerl}e d •• • • " 
r 
I 
the Charter fails to reveal e.ny _article specific lly 
, I , 
authorizing the United Nations to send a -comm1ss.1on into a 
territory in o:r ,el" to observe elections, such a power can 
only be implied . In the case of Korea the parties to th'e 
greement drew different implications,. and, as yet, no im-
partial tribuna J has authoritatively determined the e-ompetene 1& 
9f . the United N+1one, or part of it, to enforce & decision 
of this nature upon a dissenting state . 
·, The ~es J lt of ·the separate elections in North Korea 
' and $ou .~h Korea~ as the esta'blishment of two rival g.overn-
ments in Korea . I Both of thes government$ developed - the 
attributes of st 1atehood. . Eaeh was organized and exercised 
effective • eontro over a defined terr.itoz,y . 'l'he independence 
of eaeh was recognized by other states, although South Korea, 
was, 'in .addition [, overtly r~eognized by the United Nations 
and North Korea as not . Whatever differences 1nternatlonal 
lawyers may have ! over the effect of reeogni ti .on on the legal 
status of the st~tes in question, there was no doubt that 
both . Korean ' ()ovre mnents were physically capable of conducting 
their own 1nternrt1onal relations . Finally, although each 
Government claimed the right to represent all of Korea, ea:cb 
· was the creation ! of a great powe-r whi.eh :was· ne>t likely to ·: 
allow its proteg, ithout protest a.t th;e ver.-y least, to be 
divested of control Qf its territory . 'Thus, there is a good 
I I ' 
, ·r Supra ._, pp. 25 ... 28. 
I . 
i 
. i 
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basis for th . pQsition that two st tes were in fa~t created 
from one Korea. 
I .. 
• Status of the . . People• s Republic of China 
How do he 1ssues · rs.1sed :tn the Korean problem 
appear from the standpoint of the law .of nations? . Since the 
absence ot the · Soviet Union from the Council -because of:·a · 
I 
difference of v'ew on the q~~•tlon of the 'repr~eentati.,;, of 
Ohina in the Un~ted ijation s, the statue of the People's 
Republic 
March 8, 
'' . . ' 
of Chi~a has become of increasing importanc . ·on 
1950, the Se~retary-General of' the U~ited Nation ·s 
• I . 
• ,; I 
eirculated a memorandum to the members c,f the Seeurity 
I . . . 
Council hich commented on the legal aspects of the problem 
I 
. I . . . . 
, The writ . r feels that the suceess1on of events in , 
Korea trom the J·ime of the el e ctions ot May 10, 1948, on, 
created ao .. ~y distinctions be -tween NQrth ,K_orea_ and South 
Korea, whieh we e likely to become permanent cbaracteri sties, 
that two separa e states came into being . The holding of 
separate electi1ns in the North and South was one step . 
Anothet> as the stipulation of the United Nations Oom:mis. ian 
on Koroea. in i .ts report to the Gen~ral Assembly that Member 
States should take into account the limitations of the . 
jurisdiction of . lthe Republic of Korea in establishing their 
relations with :IJt. (.3u~ra . , p. 27) 'fhe. • rormation of a 
sep .arate government in he North and i-ts recognition by the 
Soviet Union and ot~er states crefil,ted another di$t1nction •. 
The limitation •hieh Secretary Acheson announced had been 
placed on the u$e of American armed forces (to restore _ the 
.Republic of KorJa to its "status .. prior to the 1n-vasion 
from the No:rth) .. was stil __ 1 another . (~upra . , p . 45) Finally, 
the ultimatum b General MacArthur a, dressed to the ,.Premier 
an Gov.rnment o.f NQrth Kore ,n before his forces erossed 
the thirty•eighij'i •parallel, indicated clearly the conditions 
whieh 1n fact ~isted . (Swra . , P• 60) It ~s felt that 
those events an~ others sow enough of a distinction between 
North Korea $nd .South Korea, politically and militarily, to 
warrant their beling treated as two separate states under 
international l~w. This, of course, would not preclude an 
eventual political union . 
/' 
of the repPesemtation of states in the United N tions ,. The 
I 
memorandum held that the question of representation in the 
United Nations ad been incorr ctly linked with the qu~stion 
of recognition ,1 the governments of member states . The 
memorandum maintained that it would be appropriate for the 
United Nations organs to decide a question of rival cdai :m. 
for repreae.q .tatton in the Uni tad Nation,s on . the grounds of 
ability to empl 1 the resources and to diPe~t the · people of' 
the state concaimed in the ta k of rulfilling the obligations 
ot m mbership . If a revolutionary government pres nted it-
seli' as representing a s tate and was found to ~xercise 
authority withirt the territory of the _ ~tate ~nd was habitually 
obeyed by the b lk of the population; these conditions shoul d 
be sufficient t accord. 1 t the right to r -epresent the state 
1 
in the organiza ion. 
What SeQretary-Gener l Lie had in fact done a·s to 
submit as cr1ten1a for seating in ·the Unitet ations the 
very criteria wJich traditionally have b(¼en employed by 
stat.es fer the . · ui:-pose or according r eogrii tion to new 
governments . But in doing this, he had avoided the question 
.. 
of whether or ndt United :Nations recogni .tion -~f a government, 
for the purpose !of 
be p~edieatsd UP,on 
. . .. j . 
conducting United Nations busin, s s, should 
a prior reaolution of Whether or not that 
U. N. G • .. • Off • . Rec ., "Annual Rep~rt · of' the Secret ary • 
Gen ral of the Work of the 0I"ganization, l Ju l y '1949-
30 June 1950," $th Ses -siont Supp . 1, p . 33 . Arti cle 99 of 
the Charter state s: fiThe Secretary - General may bring to the 
attention of the Security Council any matter i•,whi~cll in his 
opinion may thre ,aten the maintenan ce of . 1nterna~ (1onal pe ce . " 
., 
h. 
• 
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government attained legal status by virtue of third party 
recognition apart from the United Nations _. 
I -
· In the jinooo Arbitration case (1923}, the 
Ch1ef Justice William Howard Taft; held that "thQi 
Arbitrator, 
change by 
r ·volution upse s the rule of the authorities in power under 
the then existing fundamental law, and sets aside the tunda ... 
mental law in so far as the change of rule ma.ltes 1 t neees-
sary . "1 Also "T!e legality or eenstitutionalleg1timacy t:,f a 
~ facto governient is without importance internationally so , 
2 
far as the matter of reprasenting the state is concerned-" 
The Tinoco deci,ion made it clear that a revolutionary -
gove-rnment which had established it -self in such a way that l -
"lill within its influence recognize its cont:ro'l" binds the 
nations, and "s far as its international obli.gations are 
I 4 
concerned, it represent.s the state . tt If one accepts the 
above .criteria, he is obliged to conclude that the Central 
People's Government of the Feople's Republic of China is the 
actual governm e t of the mainland of China . 
- I 
· In Luther v. Sagor (1921), a British Court of' Appeals 
I 
hel d that tt1r t ,e party seeking to dislodge the existing 
government succe~ds, and the independence of the government 
it has set up is recognized, then the acts of such govern - . 
ment from the . c mmenoement of' its existence are regarded as 
l I 
Briggs, 1938, The Tinoco Arbitration, 1923, p . 1.20. 
2 
Ibid . , p . 117 . 
3-
Ibid., p . 120 4-
lbid . , p. 117 . 
-
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l 
those of an ind pendent n tion . " Since the C ntral People's 
I 
Government of th People's Republic of Chin was proclaimed 
to be"tho sol 1egal government to repre~ent all the people 
I 2 
of Chin on October 1, 1949, and since no e.ffeetive _resis--
tanee to dislodge it as the Government - of China has been 
itnessed since !that date, under international law that 
~ 
Government should be regarded as the legal Govemment ot 
China since Oct1ber 1. 1949 • 
. Althoug~ international law would support the vie · 
taken in the Secreta.ry-General 1s memorandum to the Seeur:tty 
Council in Maro~. 1950 ; the various o~ga.n$ of the Unitea 
Nations have pre erred to take their stand in regard to 
Chines represe tation on the groun d of political xpediency . 
I They have taken this vie in spi~e . of the fact that the 
Secretary~Genera1 had cited precedent within the United 
I Nations itself t the effect that there had not been a single 
instanc of a ch llenge of the ere dentials of a r presenta-
t1 -ve ot a rev_ olut l ienary government in the United Nations 
. 3 
until the Chines question arose . 
American , objeetions to the recognition by th. United 
Nation s or the representative of the Peoplets Re-public of 
1 . 
Briggs; 1938, A. M. Luther v. James Sager & Co. , 
1921, P• 101. I 
2 I U.N. S.O"' Off. Rec., 5th Yr. , 527th Meeting, 
28 November , 1950, No. 69, P• 3. 
3 
Yuen-Li~Liang, •R cognition by the United Nations of 
the Representation of a ember State: Criteria and :Procedur , 9 
American Jo~rnal of International Law, Vol . 45 (1951), p . 704. 
-02 .. 
China rested on two major grounds ~ In speaking before the 
Ad Hoc· Political Committee, Ernest Gross maintained that the 
honesty and intJgrity of the United Natiens was involved in 
I -
the recognition of a new regime ~· He contepded .that "even in 
applying the er terion of control between two competing 
regimes, the qu stion whether the people freely aocep~ed 
either or both legimes might be considered in determining 
whether either iegime had real control over the State . " 
He also felt th,t "the purposes of the United Nations would 
not be furthere 1 by ignoring the fact that one or other of 
two oompetingcllaimants for accreditation was unwilling and 
1 
unable to carry jout the obligations laid down in the Charter . 
T~ Unit ed Stat 1s, therefore, raised two questions whieh 
would have to be met by the People's Republic of China be fore 
I 
it would be recognized by the United Sta.tea . Did the Chines 
people voluntarily ecept their new gove rnment? Also, was 
the People's RePiublic of China willing to carry out the 
obligations laidj down in the Unite~ Nations Charte?"? 
I The Status of Formosa I . -
The wartfme agreements also made provision for the 
future of For mos1. Under the Cairo Declaration 2 Formosa ttwas to be restored to the Republic of China,~ and this 
3 
decision was confirmed by the Potsdam Agreement . But ass. 
1 I , , 
U. N~G. A11_ orr -. Ree . , Ad Hoc Political Committee , sum-
mary Records of -Meetlng , ' 30 September-14 December, 1950, P • 120 . 
2 I Supra.. , p . 16. 
3
sup~a. , 1pp. 16- 17. 
I 
result of the civil war in China, Formosa became the seat of 
Chiang Kai -s hek's Nationalist Government after its defeat on 
the mainland or\ China in 1949 and has continued so to the 
present day . T6 hat country does Formosa then belong? 
As noted by the _Swiss Federal Tribunal in Lepesc hkln 
v. Gossweiler <+923), "it is a unive rs-ally recognized and 
incontestable principle of the 1 w of nations that modifica-
tions in the form of government and in the intari or Ol'ganiza.,. 
. I 
tion of' a state can have no effect upon its rights and 
obligations in international law; in particular, they cannot 
abolish the rigllts and obligations resulting from treatie .s 
I 1 
which that state has concluded." Since Formosa was to be 
returned to China after the sec ond World War, and was actually 
I 
delive red into the hand s of Chinese Nationalist troops, what 
is its status as a result of the Chinese Civil War? 
The Chinese Nationalist delegate in the Security 
I 
Council s id that "Formosa was looked upon by the Chin-e ,se 
2 
people in the same light as the other provinces of China . n 
I 
At the same time, he said that he was thankful for having the 
American fleet protect Formosa from an attack from the Feople•s 
Republic of China. From th,e statements of the Chinese 
Nationalist dele ~ates one can only conclude that the Chinese 
Nationalists have inten ded to use this protection in order to 
1 
Briggs, 1938, Lepesehkin v . Gossweiler & Co. , 
Switzerland, Federal Tribunal, 1923, P• 48J •. 2 . 
Supra., PP• 40~41. 
gain the time and resource necess ry to lunch a counter -
revolution on them inland of China . ocordingly, th 
Formosan action \ taken by President Truman· ould seem b st to 
I 
be regarded as ar d intervention by the United Stats in th 
Chinese Giv11 W r . It is true that there "1s no rule of 
i2ternat1onal 1 w which ' forbids the government of one state 
from r ndering assistance t the established legitimate 
I government of another state with a view to en bling 1t to 
l 
suppress an insurrection ag inst 1t authority . " But will 
th t rule continue to apply in this ease? It has already 
be en pointe d out that the government in question is no long r 
established on them inland, and that since October 1, 1949, 
I 
the Government of the People's Republic ot China has been 
I 
acting as the effective government of China . 
In 11 llkelihood, th Truman order of June 27 , 1950, 
prevented the Chinese Communists from seizing Formosa . Sine 
that time the government of Formosa has be n treated by th 
United State$ and many other states as the le ,gi timJte govern -
ment of Ohina . Preservation of the Chinese Nationalists on 
the island of Forpiosa, ith a definite territory and 
definite population under its control, plus the r ~ognition 
2 
by many other states of the right to conduct its own for ign 
relations, has served to make Formosa a~ facto s t t ·• Thus 
we ·may conclude tat there are actually two Ghin s, one limited 
1 
Br1gga, 1938, Editor's Note, p . 744. 
2 
Supra . , PP• 37-38. 
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to the control of the inland, and the other limit d to 
Formosa. 
It became apparent that the situation created by the 
I 
formation of two rival Chinese states who disputed the t rri-
torial limits oft their respective jurisdictions ould create 
a menac to the security of the P cific area. In an endeavor 
to solve the problems created by this condition, the United 
States appealed to ·the United Nations . On September 20, 1950, 
.. I 
the American Sec(l'etary o!' State, Dean Acheson, st ted that 
American position befor the General ~ssembly . He said: 
The aggressive attack upon the Republie of Korea 
ereated the urg nt necessity for the military neutrali-
zation of th island of Formosa . The l'res;t.d.ent of the 
United State, in announcing on 27 · June the measu:ve~ 
taken to effect th~t neutralization, emphasized that 
those measures were to prevent military attack by main .. 
land forces , gainst Formo a and by forco .s from Formosa 
against the mainland. The President made it clear, at 
that time, and he has made it clear on several o.ccasions 
since, that those measures were tak en Without prejudice 
to the future political status of Form,osa, and that the 
United States had no territorial •ambitions and sought no 
special privileges or position with respect to Formosa. 
It is th~ belief of my Government that the problem 
1 of Formosa and the nearly eight million people who in-
habit it sho~ld not be settled by force or by unilateral 
action . We believe that the international community has 
a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter 
settled by peaceful means . Accordingly, the United 
States delegation proposes that the General Assembly 
should direct its attention to ,the solution of this prob-
lem in circ~stancea in which all parties concerned and 
·interested have . a full opportunity to express their 
views, and in which all parties concerned agree to re -
. frain from th use · of force while a peaeeful and equitable 
solution is being sought . We shall therefore request 
that the question of Formosa should be added ·to the agenda 
as a matter - of special and urgent importanee.l 
, 
U.N. O.A. IOff . ~ee . , Plenary Meetings, Verbatim 
Records of Meetings., Vol. I, 19 September - 15 D camber, 1950, 
p . 25, par . 63-64. 
I The Intervention of the People's Republic 
oi Chi-na in the Korean War 
Having come to the conclusion that two states had 
been created in 1Korea, the question arises as to the legality 
of the Chinese Communist intervention in that area in 
I 
November, 1950.j The argument could not be advanced in tp.1 
case that this as aid to the established legitimate govern-
ment to crush an insurrection against its authority . As 
explained above, 1North Korea and South Korea should be con~ 
I 
sidered as independent states , and the war between them an 
international ar, rather than a civil war . Thus, aid to 
one of the belligerents should be classed as aid to another 
state, and so co~stitute intervention in an international war. 
The actu,l intervention of the Chinese Communist s 
would seem to contradict an assumption that the Korean action 
was a legal Seou~ity Council enforcement measure . When the 
forces of Communist China entered the field, a powerful Chinese 
army went into military battle against an action suppos edly 
endorsed by the rbpresent tive of China on the Security 
Council . Thi s anomalous state of affairs was brought about 
by a misrepresentation of the Chinese State in the Security 
Council . I To contend that the Chinese Nat ionalist delegate in 
the Security Council represented the Chinese State, op its 
people. for the P1¥'P0Se ot enforcement measures, would over-
loo k the conditions which existed on the Chinese m inland . 
Collective Sec~ritz ThroUiffi the United Nations: 
Enforcement Measures Agreed tJpon at San Francisco 
At San lfranc1aco the various ways in which enforce-
ment measures should be taken in order to maintain or restore 
I 
international peaee were discussed at length . Two major 
plans ere deve ~oped . One entailed the placing of primary 
responsibility ip the Security Council . Its advocates 
pointed to the inequality or power which exi sted in - fact in 
I 
I 
the international comm.unity . Because or this inequality, it 
was pointed out, the major burden of enforee ment mea$ures 
I 
would have to be \borne by the great powers . This burden 
would ·fall primarily on the shoulders of the great powers 
for three main r asons: first, because the great powers had 
I 
the greatest potential resourees for carrying out enforce -
\ 
ment measures; second, because the great powers were e pable 
of carrying a larger proportionate share of the obligation 
I 
pe'r state; and t~ir<\, t because collecti v_e action on the part 
of less power f'ul \States would be ineffeeti ve if opposed by 
any single great power . The experiences of many of the 
lesser powers in the League ot Nation s and in 1nternat1 'onal 
I 
I 
affairs in general led them to q~estion the degree of 
I 
security they mlgb.t be able to expect from such an ar~ange-
1 
ment . These stats felt that the unanimity prfnciple -g~ve · 
I 
too mueh power to lthe already great states -- power which they 
I 
might not devote entirely to the mutual interests of all, 
I 
concerned . The lesser states also feared that the gr eat 
powers might no reach agreement and thus might leave the 
1nte -rnational o:t-ganization powerless and ineffective in a 
I 
time of need . Accordingly, they advocated a plan which would 
I . 
subject the Security Council's decisions to review by the 
- I . -
General Assembly, in which no veto applied, states we:re given 
an qual vote, 
va.1led . 
d the decision of a two - thirds majority pre-
The lesser powers realized that the history of great 
I powers lent little support to the view that great powers 
would be primarily motivated by altruistic principles in con• 
ducting their international relations . They realized that 
great p_owers, as well as lesse r powers, had their own national 
interests to promote and that the promotion of those interests 
I -
was not always if the common interest . _ 
I Italy's ig gression in Ethiopa, Japan's aggPession in 
Manchuria, and Germany's seizure of Austria were still fres-h 
I . . 
in t he minds ot i any st~t~smen in the world . The lesser 
powers found it !asy to visualize the culmination of circum-
stances under wh eh they might become defenseless if they 
were entirely deJ endent .upon the unanimity of the great 
powers in order 
1
o have at their disposal a legitimate means 
or effecting the~r collective security . Although th~y granted 
the superiority ~fa system of collective security which 
would place at t ~e disposal of the international community the 
combined strengt~ arid resources or the great powers, they were 
I 
not convinced tha it such a unity ·would always prevail . The 
I 
lesser powers were informed that under some extreme 
circumstances all the nations might have to choose among them-
s lve whether they wished to go to ar or not . The lesser 
po ers were the q confronted with two alternatives . -fhe first 
s to place their trust in the great powers to act t'og ther 
to preserve th peace and to rely upon five great powers to 
act in unity in the common int rest . The second alternative 
was to insist upon addition l methods of maintaining peace 
hich would be 1, addition to the unity of the five greJt 
powers . At this point, the lesser powers were informed 'at 
San Francisco th t any ttempts to alter or supplement - the 
I five po er formutla migh_t see the representatives of the lesser 
po ers returning ! to their oountries without a Charter . · 
After mueh d liberation, a compromise was reached . 
The lesser powers would agree to the unanimity principle if 
the General A sembly ould be granted as wide a scope as 
I possible wh11 the Security Council was not actually eon-
I 
sidering an issue . In addition, the Charter was to b eon -
t~ued with flex i bility, and in suep a way as to allow the 
United N tions to develop by precedent . Finally, the Charter 
s to be subject to endment . 
The great powers pledged a constructive use of th 
veto . The lesser ! powers greed to place their trust in the 
great powers , with the stipulation that the General Assembly 
be granted the wi~est rreedom possible in its d1soussion and 
consideration of international a£f irs . In order to -insure 
that all the powers would still have a forum in which they 
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could speak on equal ter ms, the technical committee at San 
Francisco, whic~ was considering the powers of the General 
Assembly, made an interpretive .declaration to this effect, 
which was included in the permanent records of the conference. 
I 
Thie declaration . stated: 
The General Assembly will have the right to discuss 
any questions or any matters within the scope of the 
Charter or relati~g to the powers and functions of any _ 
organs provided in the Charter . It will be authorized 
to call tlle .!attention of the Secur1 ty Counei-1 · to si tua -
tions likely to endanger peace and security . When the 
S~curity Co':'fcil in the discharge _of its special . 
respons1b1lilb1es is dealing with a dispute or situation 
wh~oh may en?anger , the peace, the ren ral Assembly can-
not make recommendations on any such dispute or situa-
tion. It is, howeve.r, laid down that the Secretary-
General shall, with the consent of the Security Council, 
notify the Assembly- - or ~the members of the Organization 
if the Assam ly is not in session - -immediately the 
See~ity Council ceases to deal ith an such mat~ers . 
In other res~ects, however, its right of recommendation 
tQ the .Seeuri;ty Council, the member states . or both is . 
as broad as ,ts right of discussion . It includes the 
right to recommend measures for the peaceful djustment 
ef any situation, regardless of origin, which the 
Assembly deems , li~ely to impair the general welfare or 
friendly relations among nations; the right to make 
recommendatio b.s on the. general prineiplas of coop .era.-
tion in the maintenance of international peace and 
security, inc~uding those governing armaments and the 
regulation or1 armaments; and in addition wide powers of 
recommendation in economic, social, cultural, an.d 
humanitarian matters . . -, 
'The Assembly will b~ empowered to "rec ive" and 
"cons ,ider" reports from other bodies of the Organiza-
tion including the Security Council . The reports of 
the Security 9ouncil shall include an account of the 
measures which it .has taken to maintain international 
peace -and security . 
Commissio~ II .calls particulaf attention to the 
word llconsideru a used in the Charter in connection 
with reports of the Security Coun~il and othe .r organs . 
It is the int~ntion of Commission ll that this word 
shall be interprete ·d to encompass I the right • to discu$S, 
and that the power of the Assembly to di ·scuss and make 
recommendations as . defined in Articles ·10, 11, and - 12 
and 14 is not to be limited in any way with respect to 
I 
... 91 
its consideration of reports from the Security Council . 
Commiss ion +I recommends that this plenary ses sion ap -
prov this interpretive declaration of the Commission 
and include it in the permanent recor d of the cont e renee . 1 
o Improvised Security Ar rangements 
as a Result of the Failure to Achieve Great Power Unity 
' I 
The unanimity principle agreed upon at San Francisco 
called for the negotiation of special agreements b -tween the 
Security Council and member states in order to make available 
to the Council the armed .forces upon which it was to rely , i f 
n eessary, to carry out its re ponsibility for the enforce -
2 
ment of collective security . The ch ·rter also provided for 
th establishment of a Military Staff Committee "to advis 
end ssist the Security Goun¢il on all questions relating to 
the Security Coun
1 
il's military requirements for ihe mainte -
nance of international pe aee and security ••• • " This Mlli-
tar7 St .ff Committee was to'bonsist of the Chiefs of Staff or 
the permanent members of the Security Council or their repre • 
se nt a ti v a·•" It was to b responsible "for the strategic 
direetion of any _ atned forces ~laced t the disposal of '·the 
S eurity Council . " The collective seeurity system envisaged 
at San Francisco as written into the Charter w1th explicit 
u.N. Conf . Intntnl Org . , Vol . _8 , Commission II 
(General Assembly) , Revised Report of the Rapporteur of Com-
mission II to the Plenary Session, June 24, 1945, pp . 266-67. 
The report w s appnoved without comment or objection at the 
Ninth Plenary Sess1 1on, Jv.ne 25, 1945, U. N. Oonf . Intntnl Or13. , 
Vol . I (General) , p . 623. 
2 
Charter of the United Nations, chap . VII , art . 43. 
3 
Ibid . , art . 47. 4-
!!1! · I 
I 
I 
• 
provision having been made for retention by the permanent 
members of the direction of any United Nations armed forces~ 
It was oreseen t hat this system, based on the prin-
ciple of unanimi \ty, would not cox:1e immediately into force .• 
Consequently, additional provisions were made for the period 
between ratif ,ication of the Charter and conclusion of the 
special agreements necessary to give effect to the enforce-
I 
ment measures envisaged in Chapter VII . For this purpose 
I 
/ 
Chapte~ XVII (Transitional Security Agreements) was included 
in the Charter . Article 106 of this Chapter provided that: 
Pendin g the coming into force of such special agree .-
ments referred to in Article 4.3, as in the opinion of 
the Security Council enable it tQ begin the exercise of 
its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to 
the Four-Nation Deelaration, signed at Moscow, 
October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of Para graph 5 of that Declaration, coa-
sult with one another · and, as occasion requires, with 
other members of ·the United Nations with a view to such 
joint act i on on behalf of the organization as may b 
necessar y for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and secu r ity . l 
It may be see n fr om Article 106 that measures entail -
\ . ' ' 
ing the use of armid force under Chapter VII of the Charter 
depend upon the conclusion ot the special agreements mentioned 
i n Article 43 of the Charter . Since th se special agreem nts 
have not as yet been concluded, it may be assumed that those 
Articles of the Ch~ter which depend upon the agreements are 
inoperative . This renders Articles 42 to 47 of ·the Charter 
\ . . ,, 
inoperative, and le~ves Articl s 48, 49, and 50 open to 
1 
Charter of the Unite d Nation$ . Chap . XVII, art . 106. 
\ 
I 
question, since the latter were originally written to accom-
pany the former-, 
Wh n hoitilities broke out in KoPea in June, 1950, 
and the Security Council found that its call for a cease-fire 
I 
was ignored by the forces of North Korea, the United Nations 
was faced with t~e task of implementing some policy of collec-
tive security in order to restore international peace in the 
area . The Security Oouncil therefore resorted to 1mproy1sa-
tions in order to restore international peace . Two of these 
improvisations were the resolutions of June 27 and July 7. 
Where in the Charter could authorization be found for . enforce-
ment measures? 
It has already been pointed out that the lack of the 
special agreement~ mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter 
preclude ·the use of Articles 4.2 to 47. Would Article 106 
then apply? According to the American interpretation of 
Article 106 expressed at San .Francisco , "the Security Council 
would delay in exercising its functions only with respect to 
I 
t~ose functions whose performance would be impaired by the 
non-existence of appropriate special agreements under para-
1 
graph 5, Section B,\ Chapter VIII . " Since Article 106 left 
l 
U. N. Conr . 1 intntl . Org. , Vol . 12, Commission III, 
(Security Council), p . 534. The dele gate s at San Francisco 
revised the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals . The Dumbarton Oaks 
Proposals were arranged so tnat Chapter VIII bore the title: 
"Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and 
Security Including Prevention end Suppression of Aggress1on .. 0 
Under Chapter VIII were three sections: Section A, "Pacific 
Settlement of Dispu~es," Section B, "Determination of Threats 
to the Peace or Acts of Aggression and Action With Respect 
Thereto," and Section O, "Regional Arrangements . " At San 
Francisco Section A provided the basis :for Chapter VI of the 
Charter and Section B the basis for Chapter VII. 
t he determination of the degree to hieh it would be appli-
cable up to "th~ opinion of the Security Council," one would 
expect the Security Council's opinion to be the dec~ding 
factor in the usb of Article 106. The Seaurity Council ~id 
not mention Arti cl e 106 at the time it considered the use of 
, nt'orcement measures in Kore a . Th refore, one could conclude 
that Article 106 was inappllcable . 
The only r emaining article in Chapter VII of the 
Charte r which could be used a a basis for au~horizing en-
forcement measures is Article 39. Article 39 of the Charter 
states: 
The Seeurity Council shall determi ne the existence 
of any threat :to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression ~d shall make recommendation , or dec i de 
what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to ~aintain or restore international peace 
and security . 1 
Since there had been difficulty at San Francis co in 
determining the mea,ning of the word "~ecommendations" and 
lso the word "measure s " as used in this text , an interpre -
tation was drawn up \ which met with the unanimous approval of 
the technical committee consideri ng the drafting of what be-
came Article 39 of the Charter . The interpretation observed: 
(1) In using the word "recommen dat ions" in Sectio n B, 
as already found in paragraph 5, Section A, the Committee 
has intended to show that the action of the Council sotar 
as it relates to the peaceful settlement of a dispute or 
to situations gi;ing rise to a threat or war, a breach of 
the peace, or ag :ression, should be considere d as governed 
by the provision contained in Section A. Under such an 
hypothesis , the Council would in reality pursue 
Charter of the United Nations , art .• 39. 
I 
I 
\ 
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simultaneously two distinct ctions; one having for its 
object the settlement of the dispute or the difficulty; 
and the oth~r .the .enforcement or provisiQnalmeasur~s, 
each of which is governed by an appropr1 te section in 
Chapter VIIJt . ' . , 
(2) . It 11s the Committee •s view that the power given to the Oounc;il under paragraphs land - 2 ·not to l"eaort to 
the me s\ll"es contemplated . in paragraphs 3 and 4, or to 
resort to them ·only after havin g ,sought to -maintain or 
restore peae~ by inviting the parties to consent to 
certain consar :vatory measures., i-e.t'ers above · all to -the 
presumption !ln a threat of war . The Committee is unani.., 
mous in the ~elief that.- · on the eontr~:ry, in .the case ot 
flagrant aggression imperiling the existence of a member 
of the organ~zation, .enf orcement mea.sure -s should . be ta.ken 
without delay, and to the full extent required by the 
circumstancef5, except that the Council should at the same 
time endeavo~ to persuade the aggressor to aban don its 
venture, by ~h~ means. contemplated in Section A and by 
prescribing c\°nservator~ measures . I 
As alreadlY mentione d , Section A of Chapter VIII of the 
l 
DUlnbarton Oaks Prfposals became Chapter VI of the Charter, and 
Section B became ~~apter VlI of the Charter . Appl~oation of 
the $an Franc1sco 1interpretation to Article 39 or the Char ter 
. . ' 
in a case -of flagJJ.ant aggression would r·equ1re that the I . 
Council follow "sfm~ltaneou .sly two distinet ~ctions, one 
having for its obj 'e·ct the 
difficulty, and tJ, other 
measures." Thus, I n the 
settlement of the •dispute or the 
the enforcement or provision al 
case of Korea, if the Security 
Council should decide to invok Article 39 in order to 
I 
authorize enforcement measures , 1 t wou,ld als .o be . obligated to 
I 
pursue another eou se of action &imultaneously in the nature 
ot: recommendat1om3 under Chapter VI o:f the ·Charter and oon-
servat<fry measures in an end avor to ,perauade the aggressor 
... \r.N. Conf. \ lntntl . Org . , Vol . 12, Commission Ill 
· (Security Counclf), \P• 507. Article 39 was discussed in con-junction with the establishment of a Unified Command on 
page 52~53 of the thesis . 
\ 
men the Security Council considered the enforce• 
ment measures to be taken in ~orea, no mention was made of 
Article 39 . ' Whe :i rticle 39 waa mentioned in conjunction 
with the establi hment of the Unified Oonmand on July 7 , 
Sir Gladws,n Jebb, the United Kingdom delegate, m de 1t 
elear that Article 39 was not being invoked for its operative 
l 
characte1 1istics, \but, r ther, in , r. procedn_re.l .sense . We 
may thus conclude that the Oouncil did not invoke Artie -le . 39 
in orde:r to authofi~e anf o:J?cement measures against North 
Kore . 
One other -course might be left open in order to 
provide a basis fqr enforcement measures under Chapter VII 
of th.$ Charter. ~s course would allow the use of 
. rtiole 51; but oU.ld be limited to collective self - defense 
until the Seeuri ty Oouncil bad 11taken the measures neeessary 
. · I , 2 
to maintain international peace and se"Curity . " Neither the 
UnitE3Q States nor the other st tes providing m1litary-
assistanee t~ S<>u.th .Korea. . m~nti~ned Art i cle 51 of the Charter 
in connection w1·th \the . plans made in ~he Se~urity Council 
for furnishing .this assistance . The Vnited States developed 
the interpretation that author1zet1on for enforcement measures 
could be found in Afticle l of the Ch9rter . 
Supra.., PP 52- 53·. 
g : 
Qharte~ . of the United Nations, art. 51 . 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
The Korean Action: An Effective Gollect1v 
Measure under Article 1 of the Oharter 
The Ame~ican action in Korea wa described in the 
G neral Ass mbly by the Ame·rican Secretary of State a an 
1 
effectiv collective measure under Article l of the Charter . 
This Article stalte: 
. I . 
The purposes of th United Nations are; 
l . To ma~ntain international p ace and security, 
and to that nd: to take effective collective measures 
for the prav ntion and :i-emoval of threat to th pace, 
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other 
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peac ful 
means, and i~ conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international! disputes of situations which might lead 
to a breaeh dr the peac •••• 
It 1s obvf ous that this is a foundation article of 
the Oharter and e early denotes the intention of the parties .• 
According to Bri& ly, tt·ther are no t chnical rules in inter• 
national law for the interpretation of treaties; it object 
can · only be t0 give effect to the int ntion of the •parties 
2 
a fully and .fairly as possible . " . This view is also x-
• I 
pressed by th~ Harvard Research, which states that "the 
function of interp~etation is to -discover hat was, or what 
may reasonably be presumed to have been, the intention of the 
parties to a treaty when they concluded it, and that this is 
I ' 
to b accomplished by the application of certain rules ot 
. 3 
logi~ and grammar to the instrument itself . " 
1 
U. N. G. A. Off . Rec., Plenary eetings, Verbatim Records 
or eetings, Voi. I, 19 September-15 December., 1950, p . 24. 
2 
.J. L. B~ierly, The Law of Nations (4th ed . , London, 1950), 
P • 234 . 
3 
Briggs, 1952, Editor's Note, p . 898. 
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It is obvious from a study of the preamble and the 
main text . of th \ United Nations Charter that the purpose of 
the signatories was to provide a system of collective 
s curlty . The preamble · states that the peoples of the United 
I 
Nations are "to insure, by the acceptance of principles and 
I the institution cf methods, that armed force shall not be 
I i . 
used, save in th common interest •••• a North Kor · a 
attempted to imp0ise its will upon South Korea by armed force . 
A United Nations Commission determined that the North Korean 
attack was unprovoked and was assuming the p.roportions of a 
. . I full-scale war. \he Security Council called upon North Korea 
to cease host111t es, but the latter ignored the order and 
continued to press the attack . 
Were the J embers of the United Nations t -o stand idly 
by while South Korba was devastated by the North Korean attaek? . 
\ According to the Ctarter, the Secur'ity Council would be ex-
pected to take action to stop the attack . But the special 
I 
military agreement 1nec .essary for it to take enforcement 
I 
action had not been made • . This caused the military sanction 
clauses ot Chapter rII to b come inoperative, and hence ot no 
assistance . Next, one would expect, from the Oharter, that 
I 
Article 106 (Transi , ional Security Arrangements) would apply . 
Here again the clauie became inoperative . since Russia refused 
to assist in joint 
1
ct1on . 
1 I 
Charter of the United Nations, preamble . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Since the explicit provisions of the Charter for 
I 
entoroemeht measures became inoperative, the Seeuri ty .Council 
resorted to the improv.isations necessary to make the . Charter 
I 
effective . It atte mpted to follow the proeedur out+ined in 
the Charter · as f~lly as , posaibl by having the Security 
Cow:icil reeomm ndt sanctions, and, later, a Unified Command 
wh1eh would mak ~eports to the Security Council . The nation& 
at San Francisco had signed a treaty which guaranteed th ir 
I 
"effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of thr a.ts to . th \pe ce, and _for the suppression of - aets ot 
aggression or other breaches of the peace . " Certainly, the 
signatories had a 1right to rely on that guarantee and to 
I 
construe th Ch arter in a manner which would make it effective 
in time of need . Any other course would have allowed an 
independent nation
1 
to fall the victim of armed attaek and 
would have rendered the Charter ineffective in performing it 
fundamental stat ·ed \ task . 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
\ 
I 
I 
It should ~e not d that the t~rm "recommend" is 
used here in its customary sense, rather than in t~e 
specialized sense discussed in connection with Art ele 39 of 
the Charter . 1 : 
I 
I : 'i 
I \ 
I ,I f.\ 
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CHA.Pl'ER VI I I 
CONCLUSIONS 
Mili,tf _ary Pr 1t1·$$U,?e Might Be Necesisarz in OrdeI• . to 
Implement ' a Polioy of Collective Security 
• I # i .... • ) 
Wat is t e si gnif1eanee ot the Korean action for · 
the development o'.f the ,American policy ot collective security 
through the Un!t e/d Nations? In the first place, it has demon -
strated that the , efi'ect1veness of a policy of collective I . 
security at the presen~ st~ge _ in world affairs may depend 
upon t he ability 
1
or Un,;;ited N£\t~.,i:r.1;a trtemb~1:.s tc ap p ly eu.ff'icient 
pressure against those ho threaten the semtri ty of the 
members . , The Ko~ean e.ction has been the first occasion in 
which the United States has felt it necessary to utilize 
armed might on t tie .fteld of battle in order to implement 
a policy of eoll , c t ive security through . the United Nation s . 
Distin ctions Between the Korean A~tion and _Previou,~ 
~ues t1 Gns 6ons1de~ed by t~~ 
Seeur'ity Counc;tl 
The use if military ~orce by the United States and 
other nations in order to implement a resolution of the 
Security Council I (the June ,25 Reso1¥tion) has served to 
'\"-' I distinguish thia 1case from previous ones considered by the 
Security Cou.nc11J At the time of writing, the Korean problem 
is still in a st lge at which t he- military pressures have not 
been reduced to the point Where deliberations can proeeed 
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in the more favorable atmosphere , freer of tension, that 
had been advocated so strongly in the pt-e-t{.orean policy of 
the United State~ . , The pre-Korean policy of the Uni ted States 
emphasized the neeeissity of reducing the military pressure 
1n the area of a 1dispute i n order that the parties might 
arrive at a lasting p-0litic 1 settlement . The Korean problem 
is still in a st~ge where the military pressure interferes 
with political settle ment ; hence any comparison of American 
I . 
policy with regard to collective security as expressed in 
the ~orean acti on and t he American policy in previous 
instances is subj~ct to the 11 tations imposed by these 
special ci cum.stano,es . 
The d spatch of armed assistance to the Republic of 
I 
Ko~ea b7 .the United States even before the explicit approval 
I 
of such assistane by the Security Council has a precedent 
in the pos5.tion t k en by this count ,ry with re gard to the 
l 
Alt~ou.h the Vnited States did not come to the 
point o.f sending], rge $Cale milit a!"y assistance to Greece 
I 
in 1947. it did i~sist that it had a ri ght to do so ~ even 
i f the Sovi et Unio~ sh ul cast a ne ga tive vote . The United 
States based its vie~ in the Greek case on the right of 
I . 
states to act 1nd1fidually or collectively in order to 
I promote the general pur poses and principles of the United 
Nations int e fac~ of a threat to the peaee . It maintained 
that obatruc ,1on 1J the Security Council by a permanent 
Supr a..,, P~ • 10-11. 
r-
· ember could not be used to prevent action based on Article 51 
of the Cha~ter , whieh allo ws for individual or collective 
self - defense against an armed attack 1·until the Securi ty 
Council has ta ken the me sures nee · s 'Mr -to maintain inter• 
. I . ... ., 
national peace s:q.d :3eourity . n In the Greek ease 1t apparently 
was felt by the United States that the situation was not 0£ 
such an e.,treme mture as to neeessitate armed assistance- to 
Greece. I n t he :i: rean ease it is obvious that the United 
States re a11dad . t be situ 
I 
ion as so acute that i-mmediate 
I 
military id as eceasary •. It is interesting to note that , 
so far s policy [ concerned, t e American action in K rea 
wss - aetually _lesa 1extreme than tha.t proposed in the Greek case . 
In the Greek easel the ·Unlte ,;,).tates went so far as to assert 
the r·ght to se t side the ne ative vote of a permanent 
mElmber in order t aehieve eolleq,,tive ~eourity under the 
Charter of the un · ted Nation~ . Th re as no voto in the 
Korean case . 
The persi tent ff·orte of ,' the United · States to develop _ 
a. po-liey of collective security through th e United Nation 
have cued it to develop an interpretation -of Articl e 51 of 
. I 
the Charter that would. serve to answer these needs- .... if the 
Couneil should be Unable to to.ke action in its o n right .• The 
Berlin case provid 1 d anothe~ opportun ty for the United St tes 
to announc a po .s1tion 
was in a s imilar Vein 
l 
Supra •• p . 9 . 
I 
ith rege:rd to collective security ~hat 
. 11 
to that pr nou.nced in the Greek ease . 
i 
In the Berlin <.rn.
1 
e,- Article 51 of the Charter was specifically 
named as justifying the repulsion of armed attack by the use 
of armed eounteiJe.ttaek. 
Thus we r11ry conclude th t the • eJ:>ican policy of 
colla.eti;re . s-eeur ty thro~gh the United Nations could be based 
· on the ri ght ot ~embers to repel armed ttaok through indivual 
OJ' collective a~ed measures --sa long as the actions taken 
wer-e 'in 1:loco:ra~itce with the general purposes and principles 
I 
of the Uni tad N • · 1- ns . " As we have seen; t his policy had been 
·~nnounced on sev~r l occasions prie to "he Korean action; ·the 
latter si~ply cahied it out to 1ts ·log:ical conclusions - - the 
I 
actual sending off armed assistance to a nation which had been 
·att.aeked-. 
an 
its 
In the Korean case the Unit d States has developed 
interpretat10J of Article l of t he Charter to supplement 
.formep policj deval~psd rouna Artfcle 51, and in ad:dit1on 
has launche .d the j"'Uniting for Peace,. l'eSolution as a new 
interpreta iori o the Cha.rt r" · Although the "'Uniti fo r 
Pe cen ~esolutioq is . a. product of the Korean action; as .a new 
. I 1nterpre,tat1on ot th Charte;r,, it is s ·till in th p:t1oees .s of 
development. Th sit is a po ssible basis for future action 
rather th.at a ma1ns,by hlch the principle or collective 
security has bee implemented in the Korean case . 
Th~ Ungnim.$..t~ .Pr~nctple and Seeui-itl 
• I . 01uncii Action . 
·At th~ t~me the Cnarter .wa$ drafted th ~ Second World 
War was still in !progress., and the sueeess.tul conclusion of 
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that ar necessitated the unity of the great powers. This 
necessity, in addition to the previous experience of successful 
unity during th war among the great powers, gave the great 
porers eontidence in their ability to , work together to 1ard a 
common goal . I I wa,s only natural, _ in drafting an instrument 
for the preservation of peaee in the post-war years, that the 
great ·powers sh Ju ld desire to continue a suecess -ful alliance 
then in sight 04 its goal of complete dsf'eat o:f Germany and 
Japan . If the unity of the great powers could provide a 
means whePeby t 
1
e greatest aggressor nations in the twentieth 
century could be subdued, truly 6 such a eombination might be 
valuabl e as the lroundatien for lasting peace, Unfortunately, 
a very importi;tnt f 'aetor was overlooked in ineo:rp o.rating the 
I 
premise ot unity into the United Nations Charter . -The circum-
stances under wbl:tch this unity had been achie'Ted w~re those 
I 
of war. In war ational interests not direetly related to 
winning the wa~ and to be subordinated to a common goal . 
But the Charter ja ~ supposed to serve in time Qf peae e; when 
conflicting nat1bnal interests, no longer kept submerged out 
I 
of respect for tre common aim of defend:ing national indepen ... 
dence, were quit i likely to make tllemaelves felt . 
The Efforts of the United States to Increa se 
t~ ·r owers .~f the Genet-al Assembly 
The diff[eulties in obtaining unanimity among the 
great powers in fhe Security Couneil have led the United 
States to press lfor greater and greater extensions of au.thority 
to the General Aseembly in security me.tt'$r-s . The Korean ease 
1s outstanding i demonstrating the degree to which the United 
St tea has come to accept m ny of the views expressed e,arlier 
by the leaser po ers . , 
At San F~anciseo, in the eommittee assi gned to dis cuss 
the relation of he -Gene±-al Assemoly to the Security Council 
on enforcement matters, the New Zealand delegate had propo$ed 
expanded po er s to~ the General Assembl y . The New Zealand 
I position embodied .the vie t s of many of the middle - sized and 
small .powers in In amendment which ·proposed: "!hat this 
committee express its t:i.pproval of th e plan that in all matters 
or the e.pplieation of' ,san tions, military or economic,, . the 
1 
Security Council 1assoeiate with 1 tself the General Asse mbly . "· 
At that 1ime t he dele gate of' the trnited States had 
expressed sympat J y with the New Zealand point of view ., but 
I 
had disagreed with the conelu&ions reached . The Am$rican 
I 
delegate stated that , given a Council which was free to act, 
• • • it would not be necessary to send anyone's sons 
to die again .j The OQuncil, in continuous session would 
reach into sjjtuations which tht-eatened the pe ace so as 
to pr event ad.other world war . He p l euaded. that the 
Committ ee sh<fald not weaken the Oouncil •s powers by -~e .. 
questing a "voice" for the smaller nations; to the extent 
that the voiqe would be hes.rd only in fighting a war . but 
not in keeping the pe ace . 
The America .n del ge.te c oncluded his remarks by expressing the 
view that uit wai 
w·ould be . oontrar~ 
inconeeivabl$ that any action of th e Counc il 
2 
to the wishes of a majority of the Assembl y ." 
U. N. Con,f . Intntl Org . , Vol . 12, Commission I!I , 
2 
Ibid . 
~
• 
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And gain, . at a later meetin , . t he American delegate 
reiterat ed his pl!ea 8 that the Committee preserve the Council I . . 
. as the vital ageqcy to prevent aggression •. " · In arguing 
_against the New .Zeal.and proposals the -American delegate was 
most emphatic in his demand for the principle of unif ied 
action by the pe~~ anent members: . 
• • • • Forte proper balance, he . said , the Council must 
have $trong e~ecu.tive authority; whereas, the democratic. 
As~embly oul¢1 ssUl'e every me-mber an equal vot • !f the 
l~ew Zealand amen(tment were adopted, the Assembly would 
encroach upon the Council's povers . The Council, he said, 
would be a repres$n~at1ve body of.the Assembly, just as 
the Assembly ould ne representative of the various 
eou.ntries , l 
By the fa.11.l of' 1950• the United States had decided 
that it could no onger plaee the trust in the unanimity 
principle that it had ~xpresaed at San Francisco .. On 
• I September 20, l95p.,. Secretary Acheson announced the new 
American policy . ·He statedt 
Orie of the fundamental ·purposes ot the United 
Nations, expressed in Article 1 of the Charter, is that 
it shall 0 take effective collect1\l'e measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats -tG the peaee, and for 
the suppression o,f acts of aggression or other breaches 
of peace . " 
The action of the United Nations to put down the 
aggression whieh began on 25 June against the Repub11e 
o:f Korea was exaetly the effective collective measure 
which was required . I .t marked turning point in 
history, for lt showed the way to an enforceable rule 
. of law ong nations . . 
The world now waits to see wheth~r we can build on 
the start we have made . The United Nations must move 
forward - energbtioally to develop a more adequate .system 
· of collective security, for i f it do e s not move fo r ward 
it will move pack . 
P• 316 . 
U. N. Conf . Intntl Org • • Vol. 12, Corri.mission III, 
Article 24 of the Charter gi ves the Security Council 
p~imary res onsibil1ty for the maintenance of peaee; -and 
t hi s is the way it should be . _ But i f the Security Council 
is not . able to aot because of the obstructive tactics of 
a pa.rmanent member, . the Charter does "' not leave th-e United 
Nations imp tent • . The obligation of all Membe~s to take 
action to m inta.in or restore the peace do,es riot disappear 
because of a veto . Th Cbarter, in Articles 10,11, and 14, _ 
also vests in the General Ass smbly authority and responsi-
bility for 1atters affecting international paaee . The 
General Assembly ean and Ghould organize itself to dia-
oharge its :Jesponsi bility promptly and decisively if the 
Seeurity Council 1s prevented from acting . I 
. I . 
. Aehes_on•1s proposals were deve~oped in the First 
.Committee by John Foster Dulles, who presented the American 
views with vigo 1. Holding that -the Security Council did not 
have exclusive ~owera in the maintenance of peace, ha · outlined 
. an inte-:rpretatiqn of the Charter Vlhieh would give greater 
powers to the aJn eral Assembly: 
. But the IC1barter6 which gave the Security Council 
"primary re~ p onsibility" for peac and which sanctioned 
the veto, ·a1iso gave · the General Ass am.bly the ri ght to 
make re(}e~~ndations ven in cases where the r1ght or · 
veto could oe exercised . Apart from A:r;-t1cles ll and 14 6 
Article 10 ~ave the Assembly the ri gh t to make recommenda ... 
tions to the Members on any matters "w1t ht n t he scope 
of the preseint Charter" e·~cept in relation to disputes 
O:f> situations with which the Security Council was dealing . 
In fact ,! at San Fr neisee the srnall Powers had only 
agreed to t~e power of veto on condition that the General 
As~embly we~e granted the power to intervene and to make 
recommendations within the framework of Chapters Vi and VII 
of the Char~er in eases where the Security Council was 
unable to d~scha.rge its primar1 responsibility. As the 
dele gation of the u.s.s.R. had objected to t he General 
.Assenibly haviing the ri gh t to overrule a veto, even by 
way of a ,:oecpmmendation,. the Uni ted States had advised the 
Soviet Union on 19 June 194 .5, t ha t, , in view of the short 
time which ~am.a1ned before the cere mony of signing the 
Charter, th~ United States could wait no longer and that, 
in order to break the deadlock, it as going to negotiate 
· U.N . G .. A). ' Of.'f. Rec . , Pl :enar y Me,eting, Verbatim Record 
of Meetin gs; Vo~. I, 19 September - 15 December 1950,. (279th 
Meet i ng, ro Septlember 1950) , p . 24 . 
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alone with the small Powers. The fol l owin g day~ the 
Chai . an of' the Soviet Union dele gation had in f ormed the 
Secretary o~ State that his Cpvernment agreed to the 
extension of the se .ope of Article 10 . The t .i me had now 
come to use jthe :t"ight obtained that day·. · 
· Section A of draft re ·solution A~C. i/576 provided 
that the Oe1ters.l Assembly could promptly make a recom-
mendation 1:fi 0 ecurity Council action were blocked , 
Obviously~ f4. recommen dation by the Geri.e:ral Assembly 
had not the jfo:tce of a: decision or the Seour1ty Council 
taken under . the terms of Chapter VII of the Charter ·. 
But the histroy of the Korean question had shown that 
the voluntary response to a reco endation could be even 
more effect,ve than obedience to an order; although the 
Security Co-qncil had not exercised its powers of action, l 
fiftv .. three IMembe:rs were es.rrying out its reeomm.endation . 
. ~ I 
These p:nopo~als embodied the very princi ple which the 
l, 
United St.a.tees' kl.ad opposed at San ti ... ranei aoo--pa.rticipation of 
the General Ass .mbly 1n enforce ment meaaures--and went a long 
way toward remedying the eaknesses of the unanimity principle . 
After much debate . in the First Committee and in the Pl enary 
meetings, the proposals (with some amendments) were adopted 
·I 
on Nov mber 3f 1960 1 by the oveJ>whelming maj?rity of 5i vot es 
. 2 
to 5~ 1th 2 ab tention$ . The measures adopted ,eJ'e grouped 
to g ether undei" -qhe, ·tttl~ 1'Uniting for Peace."' This resolution 
I 
dele gated mu.eh 9r the prero gative of the Security Council to 
the General Ass~ mbly in the event that the f o.rmer should be 
unable to a.et . 
1
s ome of the possibilities for future develop-
ment un de:r the "Uniting for Peacen resolution may be appreciated 
by a study o!' t;~e - following -pavag:raph: 
1. Reso ~ves that if tne. Secu,rity Council because of 
laok of unanimity of th e ~arm.anent members f ils to exercise 
U. N .. G .. .Ai. Off . Ree,. , First Committee, Summary Records ., 
20 Se:pte mber .. ia Deesmber 1950., 364th 1Vieet1ng ., 9 October 1950, 
P• 64 . 
2 
Ibid . , 5th Session .,. Plenary Meetings. 
19 lleptember-15 !December 1950,p . 347 . 
, ' 
Vol I-. 
I 
I 
i 
it primary responsibility for th maintenance of inter . 
national peace and security in any case here there appears 
to be a threat to the peace, bre _seh of the peace, or act 
of aggre siQn., the General Assembly shall consid :r the 
matter .1mm~die.te).y with a view to m 1 ing appropri ate r e .-
eornmendatio:ns to ·1!embers fo .r collective measures, including 
1n the case I of breach of th pe .ac · or s.ct of aggression the use of armed force when necessary., to maintain or 
r store intirnational pe o and sGQurity . If not in 
session at the t1me, the General Assenbly may meet in 
emergeney a e1 1 session it in twenty-four hours 0£ the 
request therefoJi'. Such emergency special session sha ll 
be called 1t requested by the Secnirity Council . on the 
- vote of any I seven me bfrs, or by a majority of the Members 
of th Unit d Nations • . 
A study
1
of the Ch ~e~ and its explicit provisions f or 
the control of nforcement measu~es leads one to the conc l u~ 
sions that thie resolution i 1n affect an extensive suppl • 
ment to the Ch :rter .. Ind ed, it iould appear- to be a new 
interpret~tion tr the Charter. The ~esolution ha,s brought up 
many questions of international lair . As e.n expression of 
the American policy of collective security through the U11i t ed 
Nations , 1t marks a definite departur e from the stand taken 
by the United States at San Fi-anc iseo ,. 
I 
I 
The Kor~an Action .s a Focal Point .for 
the :Form.ulation or an Effective 
Pol icy -of Collective Security 
At the time of 1riting, an armistice has not as ye t 
been signed .in ~he Korean w r , and there are no definite in -
u.N .G.A. Off . Rec . , 5th S,ssion ., Supplement 20, 
Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 
19 September - 15 December 1950 , P• 10 . 2 . 
For -a cfl1SCU$51on of s-ome a pacts both leg&l and 
political of this res-0lut on see L. H. Woolsey's interpre -
tation in the A J. I .L., Vol . 45 ;; 1951 1 PP • 129 - 137 • 
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indications of final terms of settlement . Any survey 
of the Korean pre lem, . consequently, . is li mi t .ed by the fa.et 
that the problem as not been fully solved . Several observe. ... 
tione can be made however. 
The s.otion has raarked the first application 
of mllita.v-y enforpem.ent measures through the United Nat1qns . 
As such it ha:s de onstrated the will of' the bulk of the 
.nations o:f the ,, 01 ;ld to develop an effective prograr11 of 
eolleetiva secur ~ty for their mu.tu.al p;re .$ervation and for 
haltins armed. ex~ans ion at its $ource . In this pro gram the 
l . . 
· united States hat1 -tiaken the lead in meeting force with foreo, 
in a. sincere · tt mpt to replaee the ru.le o:r force with the 
ru.le·of law in i .ternational :relations . The experiences 
gained in t.½.e Ko:r an aetion ma.y serve a .s. s. focal polnt from 
-·which the Amerio . n policy of collective security ·through the 
. . I . . -
United N$.tions can be dev-eloped into a more affective guaranty 
of world harmony . 
I 
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